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I. INTRODUCTION
For reasons still unknown to science, certain types of tuna
tend to associate with groups of dolphins in the Eastern Tropical
Pacific Ocean (ETP).1 Because dolphins must surface to breathe,
the dolphin-tuna association has provided an easy means of find-
ing schools of tuna. In fact, dolphins have been used to catch
tuna in the ETP since 1957, when the technology to take advan-
tage of this unique association was first developed.2
Although "purse-seine" technology has proved to be extremely
profitable, it has come at a significant cost to dolphin popula-
tions. The two types of dolphins most commonly found in associ-
ation with tuna have been depleted to one-fifth of their pre-
fishery population levels. 3 The United States has been a leader in
efforts to decrease dolphin mortality in the fishery, beginning
with the enactment of the Marine Mammal Protection Act
(MMPA) in 1972.4 The MMPA has been amended a number of
* J.D., Yale Law School, 1999; M.E.S., Yale School of Forestry and
Environmental Studies, 1999; B.A., Biology, University of Minnesota,
1994. The author wishes to thank Professor Michael Reisman for his
helpful comments and advice during the drafting of this Article and
Professor Daniel Esty for his guidance and support over the past four
years.
1. See National Research Council, Dolphins and the Tuna Industry 45
(1992) [hereinafter NRC].
2. This technology known as purse-seining involves 1) encircling a
school of fish with a large net (seine), 2) "pursing" the net (sealing
the bottom of the net), and then 3) hauling in the net and fish. For a
detailed description of the procedure see NRC, supra note 1 at 34-35.
3. See Tim Gerrodete and Paul R. Wade, Status of Dolphin Stocks Af-
fected by the Tuna Purse-Seine Fishery in the Eastern Tropical Pacific: A 36-
Year Summary, Presentation given on 12/16/95 at the 1 1th Biennial
Conference on the Biology of Marine Mammals. Abstract available
from authors.
4. Marine Mammal Protection Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1361 (1972)
(amended 1997) [hereinafter MMPA].
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times over the years, including most recently by the International
Dolphin Conservation Program Act (IDCPA) of 1997. 5 In addi-
tion, the U.S. has also been active in developing an international
solution to the tuna-dolphin conflict, and the first binding agree-
ment has just been completed. 6
This essay will first discuss some of the scientific aspects of the
debate. It will then review the legal, economic and political his-
tory of the tuna-dolphin conflict in the ETP. This background
will be used to provide a framework for a discussion of the
IDCPA and the recently created "Agreement on the Interna-
tional Dolphin Conservation Program."'7 Although the current
regulatory framework is a great improvement over earlier policy,
it also relaxes some protections. The critical question today is
whether the dolphin populations affected by the tuna industry
will continue to receive sufficient protection under this new U.S.
regulatory and international regime.
II. THE SCIENCE OF THE TUNA-DOLPHIN CONFLICT
A. What is the Actual Impact of the Tuna Fishery on Dolphin
Populations?
There is no doubt that the tuna industry has had a significant
adverse impact on dolphin populations in the ETP. Indeed, the
two stocks of dolphins that are most frequently found in associa-
tion with tuna in the ETP, the northeastern spotted dolphin and
the eastern spinner dolphin, are listed as depleted under the
MMPA.8 These two stocks have been estimated to be at 16% and
20% of their pre-fishery levels, respectively.9
5. The International Dolphin Conservation Program Act of 1997,
Pub. L. No. 105-42 (current version at 16 U.S.C. § 1361) [hereinafter
IDCPA].
6. See generally Agreement on the International Dolphin Conserva-
tion Program, May 21, 1998 [hereinafter International Agreement].
7. See id.
8. See Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Listing of the
Northeastern Offshore Spotted Dolphin as Depleted, 58 Fed. Reg.
58,285 (1993); Taking and Importing of Marine Mammals; Listing of
Eastern Spinner Dolphin as Depleted, 58 Fed. Reg. 45,066 (1993).
9. See Gerrodete and Wade, supra note 3.
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Many commentators argue that although the tuna fishing in-
dustry has had a significant impact on dolphin populations in
the past, the current level of dolphin mortality is low enough to
allow the populations to recover. 0 Specifically, commentators ar-
gue that because the current level of dolphin kills, or "takings,"
are lower than the recruitment rate" of the dolphin populations,
these killings should have no impact on the ability of the popula-
tions to grow. This hypothesis remains unsupported, however, be-
cause no evidence has been produced to suggest an increase in
the depleted populations.
Any discussion of dolphin mortality and abundance levels must
be considered within the context in which such estimates are
made. Specifically, it has become apparent that past estimates of
both dolphin mortality and abundance have underestimated the
actual impact of the fishery on dolphin populations. 2 While as-
sessment methods have improved, there are a number of factors
that continue to undermine the reliability of these estimates.
First, both abundance and mortality estimates have historically
been based on extrapolations from limited sampling. 3 Estimates
of "incidental dolphin mortality" (dolphins killed in tuna fishing
operations) have been based on data collected by observers on
tuna vessels. For many years these estimates were based on ex-
trapolations from a sampling of vessels, because until 1991 ob-
server coverage did not include 100% of the vessels.' 4 Even once
"full coverage" was reached, the data has continued to be incom-
plete; the assumption remains that smaller boats do not set on
dolphins, and therefore observers are only placed on ships with
a tuna fishing capacity of greater than 400 metric tons. 15
10. See Martin A. Hall, An Ecological View of the Tuna-Dolphin Prob-
lem: Impacts and Trade-offs; Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 1, 13
(1998) (unpublished manuscript, available from the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission, 8604 La Jolla Shores Dr., La Jolla, CA
92037).
11. Recruitment rate is defined as the reproduction in excess of
mortality for a population as a whole. See id. at 14.
12. Nancy Kubasek, et al., Protecting Marine Mammals: Time for a
New Approach, 13 UCLAJ. ENVT'L L. & POLICY 1, 5 (1994-95).
13. See National Research Council, supra note I at 52.
14. Hall, supra note 10, at 10.
15. See C. Lennert and M.A. Hall, Incidental Mortality of Dolphins in
1998]
102 FORDHAM ENVIRONMENTAL LAW JOURNAL
Meanwhile, estimates of dolphin abundance have been based
on sightings from research vessels and tuna vessels. Again, both
approaches are based on extrapolations from a limited sampling
and include- various biases that must be considered. Specifically,
estimates from research vessels are imprecise due to the difficulty
of randomly sampling an entire area occupied by dolphins. Tuna
vessel data is also skewed because tuna vessels are logically found
in areas of high dolphin densities, due to the fact that tuna ves-
sels seek out groups of dolphins upon which to fish. 16
In addition to the problems associated with extrapolation, un-
derestimates of both abundance and mortality also result from
underreporting by observers. First, it is difficult for the observers
to spot all the dolphins, alive or dead due to visibility problems
created by the sheer expansiveness of the operation, variable
weather conditions, and sometimes darkness (especially for sets
conducted after sundown).17 In addition, a more serious source
of inaccuracy comes from active deception and harassment of
observers by vessel crews. For example, a former observer re-
ported that crew members on boats and rafts would remove the
dead animals from nets before the observer could see them. 8
Another commonly reported form of harassment is the throwing
of seal bombs near observers in order to frighten them into leav-
ing their post, or worse. 9 In fact, reports of harassment and un-
derreporting by observers in the NMFS program led to a U.S.
General Accounting Office investigation of the situation, which
led to a temporary increase in enforcement.20 The problem may
the Eastern Pacific Ocean Tuna Fishery in 1996, REP. INT'L. WHALING COMM.
(in press). "Although it is not believed that the practice of setting on
dolphins by smaller -vessels is widespread, it may occur sporadically, in
an opportunistic manner."
16. See National Research Council, supra note 1, at 64-5.
17. See Hearings on S.39 Before the Subcomm. on Oceans and Fisheries
Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation 105th Cong. 2 (1997)
(statement of Christopher Croft, President of Environmental Solutions
International). Mr. Croft was a NMFS observer for four years.
18. See id.
19. See Alesandro Bonanno and Douglas Constance, Caught in the
Net: The Global Tuna Industry, Environmentalism, and the State 182 (1996).
. 20. In 1987-88, there were eight cases of harassment or interfer-
ence with fines, while in the previous ten years, there were only two
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have been exacerbated on American vessels where the captains
have access to the observers' reports, as opposed to foreign ships
where observations were made in code. 21
Finally, another potentially severe source of error in dolphin
mortality estimates is due to methodology; observers do not take
into account dolphin deaths, which occur after the dolphins are
released from the net.22 Although dolphins may be released alive,
they are often injured during the chase, encirclement and re-
lease, which leave them vulnerable to predator attack and death
from their injuries. 23 Also, during the confusion of the chase,
calves may be separated from their mothers resulting in death
through predator attack or starvation. 24 This is compounded by
the concern that the stress of being chased and encircled may
have long term effects on reproductive potential.25
In fact, Congress was sufficiently worried about these concerns
to include provisions for abundance and stress studies in the
1997 amendments to the MMPA, as discussed below. 26 It would
seem reasonable to wait until these studies have produced results
before deciding that dolphins are out of danger, especially con-
sidering that there is no evidence of an increase in dolphin
populations, which could lead to the conclusion that the popula-
tions are recovering;
B. Alternatives to Fishing on Dolphins
Proponents of relaxed dolphin protections argue that setting
on dolphins is the only viable method of tuna fishing in the ETP.
cases of fines. Id.
21. See Kubasek, et al., supra note 12, at 6.
22. See id. at 5. Estimates are based on deaths observed at the time
of encirclement, before the dolphins are released from the net.
23. See Kubasek, et al., supra note 12, at 5. Indeed, sharks are
known to circle tuna nets waiting for the dolphins to be released. Hall,
supra note 10, at 17; Trina Bellak, Humane Society of the United
States, personal communication, November 5, 1997.
24. See Nathan LaBudde, Dolphins Under Attack in Congress: Behind
the "Dolphin Death" Bill, 11 (1) EARTH ISLAND J. 6, 7 (Wtr. 1995-6).
25. See id.; Tim Gerrodete, National Marine Fisheries Service, per-
sonal communication.
26. See discussion of IDCPA in Part IX, infra.
1998]
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While it may be the most profitable method, it is certainly not
the only viable alternative. Indeed, the fishery could continue to
be very profitable through the combined use of line fishing,
school and log fishing, and through the increased use of sonar
and other detection devices.
1. Line-Fishing
Purse-seine fishing was not introduced into the tuna fishery
until 1957.27 Until that time, tuna was caught using poles and
lines with live bait. Purse-seine technology almost entirely re-
placed this traditional method for a number of reasons. First,
pole and line fishing relies on fish caught along the coasts for
live bait, thereby restricting the geographic range of the fishery.28
This restriction became particularly important in the 1970's when
a number of countries expanded their exclusive economic zones
to 200 miles, thereby excluding many fishermen from coastal
fishing grounds.29 Second, bait fishing tends to be more labor in-
tensive than purse-seine fishing, which relies more heavily on
capital.30 Third, bait fishing has also traditionally had lower catch
rates than purse-seine fishing.3I Nevertheless, there are still pole
and line boats fishing economically in the ETP.3 2
A variation of bait fishing, which is still used quite profitably
today, is that of longline fishing. Longline fishing uses baited
hooks attached to long fishing lines that are suspended at differ-
ent depths depending on the preferred catch size. Although
catch rates are lower than for purse-seine vessels, the longline in-
dustry remains viable because the fish caught tend to be larger
and can be sold in fresh fish markets at higher prices than that
27. SeeJoseph, infra note 35, at 1.
28. See Hall, supra note 10, at 5.
29. Bonanno and Constance, supra note 19, at 134-35. Specifically,
the countries expanding their EEZs included: Costa Rica (1975), Mex-
ico (1976), Columbia (1978), Guatemala (1976), and Honduras (1980).
30. See id. at 120; Croft, supra note 17, at 5. Croft argues that the
tuna industry has become overcapitalized and that an increased reli-
ance on traditional fishing methods would result in increased jobs.
31. Hall, supra note 10, at 5.
32. See id. at 6.
OF DOLPHINS AMD TUNA
received for canned fish.33 Some have argued that the expansion
of this market may be limited somewhat by the demand for fresh
fish. It is difficult, however, to predict what would be profitable
in the absence of dolphin sets.
2. School and Log Fishing
The two most commonly used alternatives to setting on dol-
phins are "log fishing" and "school fishing." Both approaches
use the same purse-seine technology as used in setting on dol-
phins.34 Log fishing takes advantage of the fact that tuna tend to
aggregate under logs and other floating objects. 3 School fishing
consists of setting on free swimming schools of tuna.36
Like line fishing, there are some aspects of log and school fish-
ing that can make these methods less competitive than setting
on dolphins. First, floating objects tend to attract skipjack tuna
which sell for less than yellowfin, the type of tuna found associ-
ated with dolphins. The abundance of skipjack tuna is also more
variable which makes log fishing less predictable. 37 This is not a
problem in school fishing, however, because free-swimming
schools consist mostly of yellowfin tuna. Second, like bait fishing,
most log and school fishing takes place in coastal areas within
exclusive economic zones, which limits the geographic range of
the fishery.38 Finally, the fish caught in log and school fishing
33. See id.; NRC, supra note 1, at 37.
34. See description of purse-seining process, supra note 2.
35. See James Joseph, The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy in the Eastern Pa-
cific Ocean: Biological, Economic and Political Impacts, 25 OCEAN DEVEL. AND
INT'L L. 1, 21 (1994). Tuna fishers have taken advantage of this associa-
tion for decades. In fact, floating objects, both naturally occurring and
artificial, are placed in the water to attract tuna. These objects are re-
ferred to as Fish-Aggregating Devices (FADs). See National Research
Council, supra note 1, at 93.
36. See National Research Council, supra note 1, at 37. Free-
swimming schools of tuna are detected by noting irregularities on the
water's surface: schools moving close to the surface of the water disturb
the surface which appears as though the water is "boiling" or disturbed
by a breeze, or may appear as a "black spot" from above. The presence
of birds may also indicate the presence of tuna.
37. Joseph, supra note 35, at 20.
38. See id.
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tend to be smaller than those caught in dolphin sets, which limit
their profitability.39
Despite these apparent disadvantages when compared to set-
ting on dolphins, both log and school fishing are commonly
used methods in the ETP tuna fishery, comprising approximately
50 percent of the total fishing effort. 40 Thus the conclusion arises
that these are profitable alternatives to setting on dolphins. In
fact, the biggest concern with these alternatives is not profitabil-
ity, but rather their potential impact on non-target species, as
discussed below in Part II.C.
3. Detection Devices
Much recent technology has been developed to detect schools
of tuna. For example, sonar has been successfully used in the
western Pacific tuna fishery and other fisheries. Sonar has been
avoided in the ETP fishery because dolphins are able to detect it
and move away bringing with them the tuna.41 To provide an al-
ternative to setting on dolphins, however, sonar technology
should focus on those tuna not associated with dolphins.42 One
potential drawback of such an alternative is that while it may be
39. See id. at 19-20. Generally, only larger tuna are found associ-
ated with dolphins; while smaller tuna are generally found "associated
with floating objects or in free-swimming schools."
40. The Provisions of the International Dolphin Conservation Act, How it
is Affecting Dolphin Mortality, and What Measures Can be Effected to Keep the
Mortality to a Minimum, Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Fisheries, Wildlife
and Oceans of the Committee on Resources, House of Representatives, 104th
Cong., 1st & 2nd Sess. at 316 (1995) (statement of Dr. Elizabeth Ed-
wards, Leader, Dolphin-Safe Research Program, NMFS) [hereinafter
Hearings]. "Under current yellowfin fishing effort patterns .... about
50% of effort is on dolphins and 25% each on school and log
sets . . . ." See id.
41. See National Research Council, supra note 1, at 91.
42. The National Research Council report suggests that this tech-
nology could continue to focus on tuna associated with dolphins by us-
ing a frequency to which dolphins do not respond. Once the dolphin/
tuna group is found, the fishers could wait until the fish move away
from the dolphins to set on them. See National Research Council, supra
note 1, at 91. However, the report fails to mention why this separation
approach is not already used in the fishery.
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helpful in finding schools of smaller tuna which are known to as-
sociate in free-swimming groups, it is "not yet known whether
mature, deep-swimming yellowfin ever form schools without
dolphin escorts. ' 43 Therefore, it may not be possible to use such
technology to find large yellowfin tuna. Nevertheless, sonar re-
search still warrants investigation, and there are also a number of
other sensing technologies that should continue to be
explored. 44
C. The Bycatch Issue
Proponents of efforts to lessen dolphin protections argue that
log and school fishing, the main alternatives to fishing on dol-
phins may actually be worse than dolphin sets because they re-
sult in higher levels of bycatch 45 of other marine species and ju-
venile tuna. Indeed, studies conducted by the National Marine
Fishery Service and the IATTC suggest a trend in which overall
bycatch is lowest for dolphin sets, moderately low for school sets,
and high for log sets.46 One reason for the relatively high level of
bycatch in log fishing is that floating objects tend to attract a
number of marine species in addition to tuna, all of which are
encompassed in the purse-seine net during tuna fishing opera-
tions. In addition to the potential damage done to other marine
species, there is concern that an increased reliance on school
and log fishing would result in a decrease in tuna population
levels. Both log and school fishing tend to catch smaller tuna,
some of which are thrown overboard because they are too small
to be marketable. Since many of these smaller tuna have not yet
reached sexual maturity, their premature death may decrease
43. See Betsy Carpenter, What Price Dolphin? Scientists are Reckoning
the True cost of Sparing an Endangered Mammal, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
June 13, 1994 at 71.
44. For a description of various potential technologies, see National
Research Council, supra note 1, at 91-2.
45. "Bycatch" refers to species that are caught and discarded be-
cause of lack of economic value. This may include juvenile tuna that
are too small to be worth bringing in for sale.
46. See Edwards, supra note 40, at 318; see also Hall, supra note 10,
at 18-9.
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tuna recruitment, and hence affect future tuna yields. 47
Although the bycatch problem warrants attention, there is evi-
dence that it is not as concerning as some would suggest and
that opponents of dolphin protections are using it as a red her-
ring. For example, there are a number of arguments to dispute
the contention that log and school fishing would result in a re-
duction in tuna populations. First, some have argued that the re-
productive rate for tuna is so high that the removal of some
juveniles is unlikely to have much effect on the overall recruit-
ment rate of the species. 48 Second, there is no evidence to sup-
port the idea that there would be a large increase in log or
school sets. In fact, IATTC data shows that the number of log
and school sets has actually decreased over the past 20 years de-
spite a decline in the number of dolphins sets in that same pe-
riod.49 Finally, the bycatch of juvenile tuna can easily be reduced
through area and time restrictions on log sets, a common con-
trol measure used in other fisheries. 50
Interestingly, although both log and school fishing have been
used in the tuna industry for decades, the IATTC did not ad-
47. See Edwards, supra note 40, at 318. (stating "If all current fish-
ing effort is redirected from dolphin sets to log sets yellowfin discard
rate is estimated to increase by a factor of about 3.5, generating a com-
bined effect of discard and changes in yield per recruit that results in
an estimated 30-50% reduction in yield.")
48. "[I]t has not been shown, for the levels of population abun-
dance observed in the fishery, that there is any measurable relation be-
tween the size of the spawning stock and recruitment, so it is not possi-
ble to say that recruitment will be affected or, if it is, to what extent."
See Joseph, supra note 35, at 20. NOAA has been cited as stating that
the level of bycatch of juvenile tuna is not "excessive" when compared
with the annual recruitment rate of tuna. See Earth Island Institute,
ETP Bycatch Issue Misused By Opponents of Dolphin-Safe Fishing, November
13, 1995 (available from Earth Island Institute, 300 Broadway, Suite 28,
San Francisco, CA 94133) [hereinafter Eli Bycatch Factsheet].
49. See Bycatch in the ETP, Ocean Alert, Wtr/Spr 1997. Based on
IATTC data, log and school sets have decreased by 48.3% and 22.6%,
respectively over the past 20 years, while dolphin sets have decreased by
23.2% in that same time period.
50. See Humane Society of the United States (HSUS), Fact Sheet on
the Tuna/Dolphin [hereinafter Humane Society Factsheet].
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dress the non-dolphin bycatch issue until the early 1990's; 5' and
this issue did not make it into the political agenda until the Pan-
ama Declaration of 1995.52 It has been known for some time that
tuna fishing involves bycatch of non-target species. The lack of
attention to the bycatch issue is therefore significant in terms of
judging the sincerity of the current concern, because it suggests
that the industry has given little or no thought as to how to min-
imize this bycatch. The success the industry has had in reducing
dolphin bycatch over the past 20 years suggests that similar ad-
vances could be made with non-dolphin bycatch if industry and
scientists addressed the issue. Rather than working to decrease
bycatch, there is evidence that tuna fishers actually increase the
bycatch rate by keeping marine animals that could easily be re-
leased alive, such as sea turtles and sharks.53 This issue was finally
addressed in the Agreement on the International Dolphin Con-
servation Program, discussed below, which includes a provision
requiring the live release of sea turtles.54
Another crucial point in the bycatch debate is that it is mis-
leading to compare dolphin bycatch with other bycatch based
solely on the number of animals caught. Other factors such as
the reproductive potential, as well as the status of the population
of various species must be considered. In the case of the tuna
fishery bycatch, the fish species caught have a reproductive po-
51. Mark Palmer, Earth Island Institute, personal communication,
November 9, 1997.
52. See Declaration of Panama (October 4, 1995) (unpublished,
available from the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, 8604 La
Jolla Shores Drive, La Jolla, CA 92037).
53. See Trina Bellak, Humane Society of the United States, per-
sonal communication, November 5, 1997; see also Croft, supra note 17,
at 8. Unlike many of the fish bycatch which die while being sorted on
the boat, sea turtles and sharks can easily be released alive. Instead, the
sea turtles are kept and eaten and the shark fins are kept for sale to
restaurants.
54. See International Agreement, supra note 6, at art. VI. Specifically,
the agreement states that the parties must "require that their vessels
operating in the Agreement area release alive incidentally caught sea
turtles and other threatened or endangered species, to the maximum
extent practicable."
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tential thousands of times that of dolphins. 55 Moreover, the
populations of the fish bycatch are healthy and stable, whereas
the dolphin populations are less than 1/5 their pre-fish levels
and are listed as depleted under the MMPA.56 Unfortunately,
these factors are never mentioned in the statistical comparisons
of bycatch, which misrepresents the problem and unfairly skews
the debate over alternative fishing methods.
In summary, there are viable alternatives to setting on dol-
phins. While the bycatch issue deserves scrutiny, it must be con-
sidered within the context of the entire fishery. The real issue is
that the tuna industry has yet to discover any single method that
is as profitable as setting on dolphins. This is, however, very dif-
ferent from the conclusion that the industry would not be profit-
able without dolphin sets. The critical question becomes, then,
to what extent should concerns of profit trump conservation of a
highly depleted species.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF THE MARINE MAMMAL PROTECTION ACT,
1972-1990
The original Marine Mammal Protection Act was passed in
1972, and has continued to evolve over the years in response to
changes in political and economic conditions. The current de-
bate over the IDCPA is best understood within the context of
this evolution.
A. The American Fishery
The essential feature of the MMPA is a moratorium on the tak-
ing of marine mammals.57 The prohibition is subject to a num-
ber of exceptions, including a provision that allows permits to be
issued for the incidental taking of marine mammals during com-
mercial fishing operations. 58 Such an exception is theoretically
55. See Croft, supra note 17, at 9; Dr. Tim Gerrodete, NMFS, per-
sonal communication, November 17, 1997.
56. See Gerrodete and Wade, supra note 3.
57. See MMPA, supra note 4, at §101a. The "taking" of a marine
mammal is defined broadly to include actual or intended harassing,
hunting, capturing, or killing of marine mammals. Id. at § 3 (13).
58. See id. at § 101 (a) (2). Exceptions are also allowed for scientific
[Vol. X
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limited by the goal that "the incidental kill or incidental serious
injury of marine mammals permitted in the course of commer-
cial fishing operations be reduced to insignificant levels approach-
ing a zero mortality and serious injury rate . . . . 9 Nevertheless, the
National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS) originally issued a gen-
eral permit to the American Tunaboat Association (ATA) for the
incidental takings of dolphins for a limitless number of kills. 60
Environmentalists, greatly alarmed by the unfettered continua-
tion of dolphin mortality in the tuna industry, brought suit in
1976 against the National Marine Fishery Service (NMFS) for fail-
ure to uphold the MMPA. 61 The court agreed that the ATA per-
mit was in violation of the mandates of the Act, but allowed the
permit to remain in place for a few months to avoid grinding
the fishery to a halt.62 The NMFS responded by establishing a
quota of 78,000 dolphin kills for 1976. The industry reached this
quota by October of that year, causing the NMFS to forbid set-
ting on dolphins for the remainder of the year. In 1977, a new
quota of 59,000 kills per year was established for the ATA fish-
ery;63 this quota was subsequently reduced to 31,150 in 1979 and
to 20,500 in 1980. In 1980 the Reagan administration extended
this quota of 20,500 indefinitely.64 The quota system was formally
recognized in the 1981 amendments to the MMPA, which re-
quired the fisheries to adhere to quotas set by the NMFS. 65 On
the other hand, the 1981 amendments weakened the MMPA by
redefining the zero mortality goals to mean simply that the in-
dustry use the "best marine mammal safety techniques and
equipment . . . economically and technologically practicable. ''66
research, public display, and subsistence fishing by Alaskan Natives.
MMPA § 101.
59. Id. at §101(a)(2) (emphasis added).
60. See Susan C. Alker, Comment The Marine Mammal Protection Act:
Refocusing the Approach to Conservation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 527, 536 (1996).
61. See Committee for Humane Legislation, Inc. v. Richardson, 540
F.2d 1141 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
62. See Akler, supra note 60, at 537; see also Bonanno Constance,
supra note 19, at 129.
63. See Akler, supra note 60, at 537, n.46.
64. See Bonanno Constance, supra note 19, at 129.
65. See Akler, supra note 60, at 538.
66. See Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1981, Pub.
1998]
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This amendment responded to the concerns of tuna fishers that
a goal of zero mortality might be interpreted literally.67
B. The International Fishery
1. Changes in the Composition of the Tuna Fishery
The international tuna market was far from static with the re-
strictions imposed on the U.S. domestic fleet by the MMPA. In
1960, the U.S. comprised 85% of the tuna fleet in the ETP.68 In
1984, this number dropped to 35%,69 slowly dropping to approxi-
mately 11% by 1991.70 This essentially shifted the bulk of the
dolphin mortality in the tuna fishery to the growing number of
foreign fleets. In 1972, when the MMPA was first passed, the U.S.
was responsible for 85% of the dolphin kills in the ETP; by 1989
the percentage had fallen to 20%. 11
These numbers do not indicate an actual U.S. withdrawal from
the tuna industry. Instead, most of the U.S. vessels either reflag-
ged7 2 or moved to the Western Tropical Pacific (WTP), where
dolphins and tuna are not found in association.73 The movement
L. No. 97-58 § 101(1)(A), 95 Stat. 979, 980 (codified at 16 U.S.C. §
1371 (a) (2) (1994)).
67. See Alker, supra note 60, at 538.
68. See Joseph, supra note 35, at 4.
69. See id.
70. See NRC, supra note 1, at 4. In 1991 alone the U.S. fleet in the
ETP dropped from thirty to nine vessels. The U.S. tuna company ban
of tuna caught with dolphins in 1990 likely precipitated this. By 1992
only six vessels remained, four of which set on dolphins. These vessels
exported their catch to Italy. See Bonanno Constance, supra note 19, at
176.
71. See Paul J. Yechout, In the Wake of Tuna II: New Possibilities for
GATT-Compliant Environmental Standards, 5 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 247,
251 n.29 (1996).
72. " 'Reflagging,' also known as 'adopting a flag of convenience'
is the practice of registering and operating a vessel under the flag of
another nation." LouAnna C. Perkins, International Dolphin Conservation
Under U.S. Law: Does Might Make Right?, I OCEAN & COASTAL LJ. 213,
218 n.19 (1995). Between 1979 and 1989, two-thirds of the U.S. fleet
reflagged. See Kubasek, et al., supra note 12, at 7.
73. See Diana Hurwitz, Fishing for Compromises through NAFTA and
Environmental Dispute-Settlement: The Tuna-Dolphin Controversy, 35 NATURAL
RESOURCES J. 501, 513 (1995).
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resulted from a variety of factors, which had put U.S. fishers at a
competitive disadvantage with foreign fleets. First, the MMPA ini-
tially focused almost exclusively on the U.S. fleet.74 Coupled with
a drop in the price of tuna in the early 80's, 75 this made it almost
impossible to remain competitive under the U.S. flag. The situa-
tion was exacerbated by the fact that many U.S. ships lost their
contracts with U.S. tuna companies who now found it more prof-
itable to buy tuna off the international market.7 6
Around the same time, many of the ETP countries extended
their exclusive economic zones ("EEZs") from three to twelve
mile zones, to 200 mile zones, thereby effectively excluding the
U.S. from much of the tuna fishery.77 Although the U.S. initially
refused to recognize jurisdiction over migratory species beyond
12 miles, 78 it did pursue negotiations with Costa Rica and Mexico
to try and establish an equitable agreement over the allocation
of tuna resources. These negotiations failed and Mexico increas-
ingly seized U.S. boats for fishing in their EEZ.79 The seizure of
fifteen American tuna vessels in 1980 led to the U.S. embargo on
Mexican tuna imports under the Magnuson Fishery Conservation
and Management Act of 1973.80
74. See Yechout, supra note 71, at 251. For example, the U.S. has
been subject to strict gear and fishing practice requirements, dolphin-
kill quotas, and 100% observer coverage. Although the U.S. has at-
tempted to impose similar restrictions on foreign fleets, these provi-
sions often trailed the U.S. requirements, and have only applied to im-
ports. See Perkins, supra note 72, at 218.
75. This price drop seemed to have resulted from both the global
recession in the early 80's and an increase in number of vessels partici-
pating in the fishery. See Bonanno and Constance, supra note 19, at
149-50; see also Perkins, supra note 72, at 217 n.16.
76. Historically, many U.S. vessels had either been owned by, or
had contracts with U.S. tuna companies. As global tuna prices fell,
many of these companies chose to buy tuna on the international mar-
ket rather than maintaining their American fleets and contracts. See
Perkins, supra note 72, at 217.
77. See supra note 29.
78. See Bonnano Constance, supra note 19, at 137.
79. See id. at 135.
80. See id. at 137.
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2. Regulatory Changes to Address the Growing Foreign Role in
Dolphin Mortality
The major shift in the composition of the tuna industry had
significant impacts on the United States' ability to influence
dolphin conservation in the ETP It was no longer possible to re-
duce dolphin kills simply by focusing on the U.S. domestic fleet.
Although the initial MMPA did address dolphin mortality caused
by foreign fleets, its impact was limited. Specifically, the 1972 Act
provided for an import ban on all commercial fish whose harvest
had resulted in the incidental taking of marine mammals in ex-
cess of U.S. standards.8' The restriction was not quantitative, how-
ever, but merely required the foreign nations to prove they were
using equipment and procedures which met U.S. standards.
As it became clear that foreign fleets were responsible for a
growing share of the dolphin mortality in the ETP, pressure rose
to place more stringent requirements on foreign governments.
The 1984 amendments strengthened the above comparability
standard. Now foreign governments not only had to provide evi-
dence that they had adopted regulations governing incidental
takings that were comparable to those of the U.S., but they also
had to prove that the average rate of incidental dolphin kills was
comparable to the U.S. rate.82 These provisions were to be imple-
mented and enforced by the National Marine Fishery Service
(NMFS). Interim regulations, however, were not published until
four years later in 1988, and these regulations gave foreign na-
tions until 1991 to comply.8 3 The inaction of the NMFS, along
with continued evidence of dolphin mortality in foreign fishing
operations, prompted Congress to strengthen the comparability
standards even further in 1988.4
The 1988 amendments required that in order for a foreign na-
tion to meet the comparability requirements they had to show
that: (1) the incidental dolphin kill rate was no more than two-
times that of the U.S. rate in 1989 and no more than 1.25 the
81. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1985).
82. See 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a) (2) (B) (1988).
83. See Maureen Dolan-Pearson, Note, Pulling Purse Strings to Elimi-
nate Purse Seiners: United States Protection of Dolphins Through International
Trade Sanctions, 42 DEPAUL L. REv. 1085, 1108 (1993).
84. See Perkins, supra note 72, at 226.
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U.S. rate for 1990 and after; (2) the percentage of annual tak-
ings for eastern spinner dolphins and coastal spotted dolphins
did not exceed 15 and 2 percent respectively; and (3) all tuna
fishing operations were monitored to the same extent as in the
U.S. by a qualified observer program such as that of the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC). s5 The 1988
amendments also provided for embargoes against intermediary
nations.8 6 Under this provision, an intermediary nation was only
allowed access to the U.S. markets if it was able to show that it
had prohibited the importation of tuna from countries embar-
goed by the U.S. 87 The 1988 amendments also required the Sec-
retary of Commerce to pass specific performance standards and
gear requirements for U.S. tuna ships.88
3. Enforcement of the new regulations
Despite the new mandate of the 1988 amendments, the NMFS
still failed to make any comparability findings for foreign nations
and made no restrictions on tuna imports.8 9 This took place de-
spite solid evidence that foreign fleets had dolphin mortality
85. See Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub.
L. No. 100-711, § 4(a), 102 Stat. 4755 (codified as amended 16 U.S.C. §
1371(a)) [hereinafter 1988 amendments]. The Inter-American Tropical
Tuna Commission was created in 1949. It has become the focal point of
international efforts to address dolphin mortality in the tuna fishery.
See discussion of the IATTC, infra at Part VI.A.
86. An intermediary nation is one that imported tuna from a tuna
fishing nation and then exported that same tuna to a third country.
87. See 1988 Amendments, supra note 85, at §4(a).
88. Id. at §§ 5(d), 4(d). The regulations are found at 50 C.F.R.
§216.24 (1992). These measures included a ban on sundown sets (sets
which occur after sundown have higher dolphin mortality); a require-
ment to use the "backdown" procedure for dolphin release from the
nets; a prohibition on the use of more dangerous explosives (Class C),
and the use of the medina panel (a fine mesh used to reduce the
chances of the dolphins getting caught and injured in the net). See
Raul Pedrozo, The International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992: Unrea-
sonable Extension of U.S. Jurisdiction in the Eastern Tropical Pacific Ocean
Fishery, 7 TuLANE ENVT'L L. J. 77, 90 n. 73 (1993).
89. See Perkins, supra note 72, at 228.
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rates two to four times that of the U.S. fleet.90 Such inaction out-
raged many environmentalists. In June of 1990, the Earth Island
Institute, a nonprofit environmental organization, brought suit to
require the NMFS to enforce the MMPA embargo provision
based on the dolphin mortality rates for 1989.91 The government
responded that the NMFS was not mandated to impose an em-
bargo until it had made the requisite findings of comparability.
Although the NMFS had already received the necessary data, it
argued that it would take months to reach a comparability find-
ing. The court disagreed with the government's interpretation of
the Act, and ordered that an interim embargo be imposed until
the NMFS had made positive comparability findings.
In response to this court order, tuna import embargoes were
imposed on Mexico, Panama, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Vanuatu
on September 7, 1990.92 Despite the government's protests that it
would take months to complete analysis of the takings data, it
was able to do so in one day and subsequently lifted the ban
against all of the embargoed countries except Panama. The
NMFS lifted the ban against Mexico despite the fact that Mexico
had "exceeded the limits for both total dolphins killed and per-
centage of eastern spinner dolphins killed for 1989." 93 The
NMFS based the decision on its own regulations, which allowed
reconsideration of an embargo based on the first six months of
takings data for the following year. Since Mexico had not ex-
ceeded the dolphin mortality limits for the ,first six months of
1990, the NMFS decided to lift the embargo. In response, the
Earth Island Institute applied for a temporary restraining order
on tuna imports from Mexico arguing that the plain language of
the MMPA required that comparability findings be based on data
for a full year. The court agreed and reinstated the embargo
against Mexico. 94 As a result of this case, the U.S. imposed em-
90. See Kubasek et al., supra note 12, at 10. Some have argued that
this inaction stemmed from the NMFS's conflicting mandates to both
protect marine mammals and promote commercial fisheries. See id.
91. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal.
1990), aff'd, 929 F.2d 1449 (9th Cir. 1991).
92. See Hurwitz, supra note 73, at 506.
93. See Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d at 1451.
94. See id. The government also argued that the regulations should
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bargoes on the importation of tuna from Mexico, Venezuela, and.
Vanuatu.95
As the heat was put on the foreign fleets, one might have
thought that many would have followed the example of the U.S.
vessels and moved to the WTP. There are a number of factors,
however, which make such a move difficult. First, it is expensive
to retrofit a vessel for the type of tuna fishing done in the WTP. 96
Second, for countries along the eastern coast, fishing in the WTP
has the added expenses of transshipment fees and extra fueling
costs.97 Finally, access to fishing grounds in the WTP is more lim-
ited than in the ETP because much of the fishery is found within
the EEZs of Pacific Island nations.9 This access limitation has
not been as much of a problem for the U.S. because of its initial
refusal to recognize the right of coastal nations to control migra-
tory species, 99 and the later agreements between the U.S. and the
Pacific Island governments.' °°
be upheld on public policy grounds as it would act as an incentive for
foreign countries to meet the MMPA standards. The court dismissed
this argument because, if anything, the regulation encouraged abuse by
allowing foreign nations to avoid embargoes despite exceeding the
mortality limits. The court also rebuffed the NMFS as being somewhat
hypocritical:
The agency's contention that it seeks only to provide addi-
tional incentives consistent with Congress' intent is further
belied by the agency's own record of non-enforcement of
congressional directives during the years which preceded the
1988 amendments. Id. at 1453.
95. See Dolan-Pearson, supra note 83, at 1109.
96. Moving to the WTP fishery may require "a vessel to refit with
a new mile-long net, a larger hydraulic system and power block assem-
bly, and new sonars to detect the tuna." See Pedrozo, supra note 88, at
115. Some have estimated that such a retrofit can cost $1 million per
vessel. See Bonanno Constance, supra note 19, at 204.
97. See Pedrozo, supra note 88, at 115. The U.S. had the advan-
tage of being able to bring its catch to Puerto Rico for processing.
98. See Bonanno Constance, supra note 19, at 205.
99. The U.S. did not recognize such a right until 1992. Further-
more, the U.S. provided compensation for U.S. fishers whose vessels
had been seized by coastal nations for illegal fishing (Fishers' Protec-
tive Act of 1954, 22 U.S.C. § 1971-76 (1988)). See Perkins, supra note 72,'
at 219 n.20.
100. Two agreements were created in 1987, which allowed U.S.
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4. Consumer Power
Environmental organizations, such as the Earth Island Institute
soon realized that attempting to change behavior through regu-
lation was not enough to put a stop to dolphin mortality in the
ETP. Although the U.S. share of the tuna fleet had decreased,
the U.S. share of the market remained strong. 101 Therefore, at-
tention was turned to harnessing this consumer power to influ-
ence fishing practices.
This strategy took two main forms. One was the imposition of
embargoes by the U.S. government, as discussed above. The
other was a public awareness campaign spearheaded by the Earth
Island Institute. The most influential form of this campaign was
a consumer boycott of Starkist, the largest American tuna com-
pany. The boycott was propelled into the public limelight in
March of 1988 when an undercover video of dolphin kills on a
tuna vessel was aired on CBS, ABC and CNN. 102 In April of 1990,
an agreement was reached with Star-Kist, in which the company
agreed to ban all tuna caught with dolphins, or any tuna caught
without an official observer on board. 103 Star-Kist also agreed to
support pending legislation on dolphin-safe labeling. 114 The two
fisherman access to the tuna within the Pacific Island countries' EEZs
in exchange for license fees and yearly economic assistance payments.
Certain Pacific Island States - Unites States: Treaty on Fisheries, Apr. 2, 1987,
26 I.L.M. 1084 (1987) (Agreement Between United States (AID) and
South Pacific Forum Fisheries Agency (FAA) on Economic Develop-
ment Assistance, Apr. 2, 1987, 26 I.L.M. 1091 (1987)). These agree-
ments were implemented through the South Pacific Tuna Act of 1988, 16
U.S.C. § 973 (1988) and the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, 22 U.S.C.
§151 (1988). See Perkins, supra note 72, at 219 n.20.
101. In 1992 the U.S. consumed 31% of the total tuna catch. See
Bonanno Constance, supra note 19, at 164.
102. This videotape was provided by Sam LeBudde, an environ-
mentalist associated with ElI. LeBudde went undercover on a Panama-
nian tuna vessel for four months and was able to videotape five hours
of graphic footage documenting massive dolphin kills. See K. Patrick
Conner, The Conversion of Starkist, SAN Fr'4cIsco CHRONICLE, June 17,
1990.
103. Jerry Moss, an American businessman who managed to gain
access to the CEO of Star-Kist, brokered this agreement. See id.
104. See K. Patric Conner, The Conversion of Starkist, SAN FRANcIsco
CHRONICLE, June 17, 1990.
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other major tuna companies in the U.S., Bumble Bee and
Chicken of the Sea, as well as a number of foreign processors,
quickly joined the ban. 05 This closed at least 80 percent of the
U.S. market to tuna caught using dolphins. 0 6
This ban was further strengthened in 1991, with the adoption.
of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA)
which regulated the labeling of tuna. 107 In order to be labeled as
"dolphin safe," tuna harvested in the ETP had to come with ver-
ification from the captain of the vessel that dolphins were not in-
tentionally encircled. The tuna also had to be accompanied by
verification, by the Secretary of Commerce or a representative of
the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) that an
approved observer was on board when the tuna was caught.
5. The Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission
In addition to the American efforts, the IATTC has played an
important role in the tuna-dolphin conflict on the international
level. All recent attempts to negotiate an international agreement
on the tuna-dolphin issue have been coordinated through the
IATTC. The IATTC was formed in 1949, as a bilateral fishing
treaty between the U.S. and Costa Rica. 08 Over the years, a num-
ber of other countries have joined and there are currently 10
member countries. °9 Many find it disturbing that Mexico, which
controls a substantial share of the ETP tuna fishery and has been
active in the tuna-dolphin political scene, is not currently a
105. See Pedrozo, supra note 88, at 91.
106. Starkist, Bumble Bee, and Chicken of the Sea alone com-
prised 80% of the U.S. market. See Bonanno Constance, supra note 19,
at 172.
107. 16 U.S.C. § 1385 (amended by the International Dolphin
Conservation Program Act of 1997).
108. Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American Tropi-
cal Tuna Commission, (date signed, May 31, 1949 - Mar. 3, 1950), U.S.,
Costa Rica, 1 U.S.T. 230.
109. Current members include: Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador,
France, Japan, Nicaragua, Panama, U.S.A., Vanuatu, and Venezuela. A
list of the current members was obtained directly from the Inter-
American Tropical Tuna Commission, 8604 La Jolla Shores Drive, La
Jolla, CA 92037.
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member.110
Some have questioned the objectivity of this organization,
since one of its major goals is to maximize tuna yield in the
ETP."'1 Indeed, it was not until 1976 (almost 30 years after the or-
ganization was created) that the member nations of the IATTC
agreed to formally address the growing problem of dolphin mor-
tality in the ETP tuna fishery. At that time, the following goals
were agreed upon: "(1) to maintain a high level of tuna produc-
tion, and also (2) to maintain [dolphin] stocks at or above levels
that assure their survival in perpetuity, (3) with every reasonable
effort being made to avoid needless or senseless killing of
[dolphins] ."1112
To this end, in 1979 the IATTC began a voluntary observer
program for international vessels as an analogue to the U.S. ob-
server program run by the NMFS. 113 Initial observer rates were
quite low, and it was not until 1991 that 100 percent coverage
was reached. 114 Once the observer program reached sufficient
levels to allow for reliable estimates of dolphin mortality, it was
discovered that the problem was much worse than had been pre-
viously estimated. "The total dolphin mortality in the fishery in
1986, the first year in which all national fleets took part in the
program, was estimated by the IATTC staff to be 133,000 dol-
phins . . . . [This] estimate was about three times the annual
levels estimated for the previous 10 years."" 5
The IATTC has continued to play an active role in the tuna-
dolphin conflict over the years, including conducting research
on the health of various tuna stocks and on the impact of the
fishery on non-target species, including dolphins. 16 The IATTC
110. Mexico was a member from 1964-78. Ecuador (1961-68) and
Canada (1968-84) were also members at one time. See Perkins, supra
note 72, at 233 n.86.
111. See Joseph, supra note 35, at 4.
112. Summary Minutes of the 33rd Meeting of the Inter-American
Tropical Tuna Commission, Managua, Nicaragua, October 11-14, 1976.
113. SeeJoseph, supra note 35, at 5.
114. See Pedrozo, supra note 88, at 96.
115. Joseph, supra note 35, at 6. Joseph suggests that this increased
estimate may have been due in part to increased fishing, but was also
probably a result of inaccurate estimates in the past. Id.
116. The IATTC publishes an annual report that summarizes these
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has also provided a convenient international forum for the nego-
tiation of multilateral agreements on the tuna-dolphin issue, as
discussed in Parts VIII and IX below.
IV. THE FIRST GATT PANEL DECISION
The U.S. attempt to reduce foreign dolphin kills through the
use of embargoes and labeling requirements had a significant
impact on foreign fleets, especially Mexico, which had one of the
largest fleets in the ETP. It is not surprising, therefore, that Mex-
ico and others challenged these restrictions.
The first significant challenge to U.S. dolphin protection ef-
forts came in 1991 when Mexico claimed that the U.S. embargo
of Mexican tuna under the MMPA violated the General Agree-
ment on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). 117 Mexico initially attempted
to negotiate with the U.S. under the GATT consultation pro-
cess."' When these negotiations failed to achieve a compromise,
studies. See e.g., Annual Report of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commis-
sion 1995, La Jolla, California, 1997. This is the most recent report
available. It can be obtained directly from the IATTC at .8604 La Jolla
Shores Drive, La Jolla, CA 92037.
117. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement
Panel Report on United States Restriction on Imports of Tuna, 30
I.L.M. 1594 (1991) [hereinafter "Tuna I"]. The GATT was enacted in
1947 with 23 original members. The GATT emerged from negotiations
between the United States and its allies shortly after World War II.
While these negotiations failed to achieve their primary goal of creat-
ing an International Trade Organization, the associated provisions on
tariffs were enacted as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.
There are now over 100 members (called "contracting parties") to the
GATT. A nation gains membership to GATT in one of three ways: origi-
nal membership in the agreement; accession under Article XXXIII of
GATT which requires approval of 2/3 of the existing contracting parties;
or sponsorship of a newly independent country by its "former parent
country" under Article XXVI. See Dolan-Pearson, supra note 83, at 1090-
91.
118. Consultation was requested on November 5, 1990. Article
XXII of the GATT allows contracting parties to initiate negotiations
("consultation") with other members regarding alleged violations of
the agreement. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for sig-
nature Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]; See Allison
Raina Ferrante, The Dolphin/Tuna Controversy and Environmental Issues:
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Mexico requested that a GATT panel be formed." 9 As discussed
below, the Panel concluded that both the primary embargo
against tuna from Mexico, and the embargo against various inter-
mediary nations, was in violation of the GATT. The Panel did,
however, uphold the DPFCIA.
A. Primary Embargoes
First, the panel considered whether the primary embargo im-
posed under the MMPA on Mexico was consistent with Article III
of the GATT. Article III allows internal regulations on imported
products as long as equal treatment is given to domestic and im-
ported goods. This is commonly referred to as the "national
treatment principal." The Panel concluded that Article III only
allowed restrictions on products, not production processes. 20
Therefore, because the tuna itself was unaffected by the fishing
method used, the panel found that the embargo on tuna caught
by setting on dolphins was not the type of regulation provided
Will the World Trade Organization's "Arbitration Court" and the International
Court of Justice's Chamber ]or Environmental Matters Assist the United States
and the World in Furthering Environmental Goals?, 5 J. TRANSNAT'L L. &
POL'Y 279, 283 (1996).
119. Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1598. Article XXIII of GATT pro-
vides for a panel consisting of three representatives from member na-
tions to be formed to investigate conflicts under GATT. Based on this
investigation, the panel will make a recommendation to the disputing
parties. If the conflict remains unresolved, the panel may submit its re-
port to all of the contracting parties for a vote. A unanimous vote is re-
quired for adoption of the report. If the party found to be in violation
of the report does not change its behavior, the Contracting Parties may
vote (again by consensus) to allow retaliatory trade sanctions to be im-
posed against the offending party. See Ferrante, supra note 118, at 285;
Steve Charnovitz, Dolphins and Tuna: An Analysis of the Second GATT
Panel Report, 24 ENVT'L. L. REP. 10567, 10568 (1994).
120. In reaching this conclusion, the Panel seemed to rely exclu-
sively on the fact that the text of Article III, and two previous Panel re-
ports interpreting this provision used the term "products," not
"processes." Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1617-18. However, in neither of
the panel reports discussed, was the distinction between products and
processes discussed. See Stanley M. Spracker & David C. Lundsgaard,
Dolphins and Tuna: Renewed Attention on the Future of Free Trade and Protec-
tion of the Environment, 18 COLUM. J. ENVr'L. L. 385, 395 (1993).
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for in Article 111.121
The Panel concluded that the embargo failed to meet the re-
quirements of Article III, and next considered the application of
Article XI, which forbids quantitative restrictions on imports. 12 2
The embargo on Yellowfin tuna from Mexico quite clearly vio-
lated this provision. 23
Finally, the Panel considered the exceptions to the GATT pro-
visions found in Article XX of the GATT. Article XX provides in
relevant part:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied
in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary or un-
justifiable discrimination between countries where the same
conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international
trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to prevent
the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of mea-
sures ...
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or
health ...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources
if such measures are made effective in conjunction with restric-
tions on domestic production or consumption .... 124
The Panel found that the MMPA embargoes could not be ex-
empted under Article XX(b) because the provision could not be
used to protect measures applied extrajurisdictionally. 125 The
Panel did not base this conclusion on the language of the provi-
sion since they readily admitted that the text itself did not limit
121. Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1617-18.
122. Article XI reads in relevant part: "No prohibitions or restric-
tions . . .whether made effective through quotas, import or export li-
censes or other measure, shall be instituted or maintained by any con-
tracting party on the importation of any product of the territory of any
other contracting party."
123. Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1618.
124. GATT, supra note 118, art. XX.
125. "Extrajurisdictionally" refers to measures designed to protect
life "outside the jurisdiction of the contracting party taking [the mea-
sure] . . . " Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1619. It is important to note,
however, that a later GATT panel came to the opposite conclusion. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Dispute Settlement Panel Re-
port on United States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, 33 I.L.M. 839
(1994) [hereinafter Tuna II].
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the protections under XX(b) to any particular jurisdiction. 26 In-
stead, the Panel chose to look at other factors such as the draft-
ing history of the provision and the implications of extrajurisdic-
tional application. First, the Panel concluded that the drafters
were primarily concerned with "the use of sanitary measures to
safeguard life or health of humans, animals or plants within the
jurisdiction of the importing country."127 Second, the Panel warned
of the dangers attached to allowing one country to impose its en-
vironmental standards on all other countries.
The Panel then went on to find that even if Article XX(b) did
allow extrajurisdictional measures, the embargo would still fail to
meet the requirement that the measure be "necessary." This con-
clusion appeared to be based on a strict test of necessity estab-
lished in a previous panel report. 121 First, the Panel concluded
that the U.S. had failed to exhaust all GATT-consistent alterna-
tives, such as the possibility of developing an international agree-
ment on dolphin conservation. 129 Next, it decided that because
the foreign quotas based on changing U.S. takings of dolphins
made the law too unpredictable, it could not be considered
"necessary."13 0
126. Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1620.
127. Id. [emphasis added] See also Stephen Fleischer, The Mexico-
U.S. Tuna/Dolphin Dispute in GATT: Exploring the Use of Trade Restrictions
to Enforce Environmental Standards, 3 TRANSNAT'L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
515, 530 (1993) ("The drafting history and scholarly interpretation sup-
port the position that Article XX(b) is limited to 'sanitary' measures.")
128. Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1620. This Panel defined "neces-
sary" to require that "(1) no reasonably available alternative measure
consistent with GATT exists, and (2) that the measure taken be the
least trade restrictive of all available alternatives." Fleischer, supra note
127, at 531.
129. This does not take into account the fact that the U.S. has
been a leader in the quest for an international solution to the tuna-
dolphin conflict. For example, the U.S. was an original signatory to the
IATTC and has been its primary source of funding. Moreover, the U.S.
attempted to create an international agreement on dolphin protection
through the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling
during the 1970s and actively participated in the La Jolla agreement
(the negotiations took place concurrently with the Panel investigation).
Charnovitz, supra note 119, at 10571.
130. Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1620.
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Having found Article XX(b) inapplicable, the Panel next con-
sidered Article XX(g). Again it concluded that XX(g) could not
be used to protect extrajurisdictional measures based on the fol-
lowing reasoning. Article XX(g) specifies measures "rendering
effective restrictions on domestic production or consumption." 13
A previous Panel had determined that "a measure could only be
considered to have been taken 'in conjunction with' production
restrictions 'if it was primarily aimed at rendering effective these
restrictions.' 132 Therefore, the Panel concluded that "[t]his sug-
gests that Article XX(g) was intended to permit contracting par-
ties to take trade measures primarily aimed at rendering effective
restrictions on production or consumption within theirjurisdiction. 
"133
The Panel went further to conclude that even if XX(g) could
be applied extrajurisdictionally, the MMPA embargo could not
meet the test laid out in the previous panel, that the measure be
"primarily aimed" at the conservation goals. Here the reasoning
was nearly identical to the necessity standard used for Article
XX(b). Because the quotas applied to foreign vessels were con-
stantly changing based on U.S. dolphin kills, the Panel deter-
mined that the law was too unpredictable to be considered "pri-
marily aimed at the conservation of dolphins."'134
B. Secondary Embargoes
After the lengthy analysis of the primary embargoes, the Panel
was able to quickly dispense with the secondary embargoes at is-
sue. First, for the same reasons discussed above, the Panel found
that Article III of the GATT was inapplicable; Article XI was vio-
lated, and Articles XX(b) and XX(g) could not protect these ex-
trajurisdictional measures.'35
The only new analysis involved the possible application of Arti-
cle XX(d), which allows measures "necessary to secure compli-
ance with laws or regulations, which are not inconsistent with the
provisions of [GATT]."'13 6 The U.S. argued that the secondary
131. Id.
132. Id. at 1620-21.
133. Id. at 1621 (emphasis added).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 1622.
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embargo was essential to avoid contravention of the primary em-
bargo. The Panel held, however, that because the primary em-
bargo was found to be in violation of GATT, Article XX(d) could
not save the secondary embargo.'37
C. Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act (DPCIA)
Finally, the Panel considered the labeling provisions of the
DPCIA. The relevant GATT provision here was Article I, the
"most-favored nation principle." Article I provides that: "any ad-
vantage, favor, privilege or immunity granted by any contracting
party to any product originating in or destined for any other
country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally to
the like product originating in or destined for the territories of
all other contracting parties." 3 '
Mexico argued that it is was discriminated against because it
fished in the ETP rather than other fishing areas. The Panel
concluded that the label does not in any way restrict a country's
access to the U.S. market, and that because the ETP is the only
ocean where dolphins associate with tuna, it is not unfair to re-
quire the labeling requirements in the ETP only. Finally, within
the ETP, the labeling requirements applied equally to all fishers
and therefore did not discriminate against Mexico or any other
country fishing in the ETP. Therefore, the labeling provisions of
the DPCIA were found to be consistent with Article I of the
GATT.
In conclusion, Mexico was the clear winner in the first GATT
panel decisions as the MMPA embargo against Mexico was found
to be in violation of the GATT. However, Mexico never submit-
ted this finding to a full vote of the GATT Contracting Parties. 13 9
Therefore, the report is not binding and Mexico was not author-
ized to take retaliatory trade measures against the U.S.
137. Id.
138. GATT, supra note 118, art. I.
139. Pedrozo, supra note 88, at 94.
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V. IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE FIRST GATT DECISION
A. JDCA 1992
Mexico appeared to have forgone adoption of.the Tuna I
panel decision in order to maintain good standing in the negoti-
ations over the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA).140 To further mitigate against negative reactions to the
panel findings, Mexico developed a ten-point program of
dolphin protection. Mexico also placed a number of full-page
ads in The New York Times assuring the American public of Mex-
ico's commitment to dolphin conservation. 14
The Bush Administration promised to lobby Congress to lift
the MMPA import ban, both in exchange for these Mexican con-
cessions following the GATT panel report,142 and to help secure
the success of the 1992 La Jolla Agreement, an international
agreement regarding the tuna fishery in the ETP. 143 Many mem-
bers of Congress, however, were infuriated by the GATT report
and strongly opposed efforts to weaken dolphin protections
under the MMPA.'"
Two proposals came before Congress for the MMPA amend-
ments. The Breaux Bill'would have implemented the La Jolla
Agreement, and would have allowed consideration of a morato-
rium on fishing on dolphins upon the recommendation of a
"competent regional organization," such as the IATT'C. The Bill
would also have provided for embargoes to be imposed on coun-
tries failing to meet their commitments under the international
agreement.145
The Breaux Bill was rejected in favor of the International
140. Bonanno and Constance, supra note 19, at 198.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 197-98.
143. Charnovitz, supra note 119, at 10571. For a discussion of the
La Jolla Agreement, see infra Part VIII.A.
144. Representative Barbara Boxer, a leader in the Congressional
effort to protect dolphins, and the author of the DPCIA, wrote a letter
to President Bush and the U.S. Trade Representative vowing to oppose
any attempt to repeal the laws found inconsistent with GATT. The let-
ter was co-signed by sixty-two members of Congress. See Yechout, supra
note 71, at 258.
145. Perkins supra note 72, at 236-37.
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Dolphin Conservation Act (IDCA) of 1992.146 The IDCA prom-
ised to lift the tuna ban for any country that agreed to a five-year
moratorium on setting on dolphins. 147 The moratorium was to
begin March 1, 1994.148 In order to lift the tuna ban, the partici-
pating country would also have had to agree to carry observers
on their tuna vessels and to reduce their dolphin mortality each
year in 1992 and 1993.149 If a country was found to be in non-
compliance with the moratorium to which it agreed, the ban on
tuna imports would have been reinstated against that country.150
If that country failed to come into compliance within 60 days,
the U.S. President was required to ban 40 percent of total fish
imports from that country. 5'
The IDCA also set additional limits on U.S. takings of dol-
phins. Total dolphin mortality was limited to 1000 for 1992, and
800 for the period from January 1, 1993 to the beginning of the
moratorium on March 1, 1994.152 The general permit was to ex-
pire on March 1, 1994. If, however, no major purse seining coun-
try agreed to the moratorium, the U.S. fishers could continue
setting on dolphins, but the annual dolphin mortality rate was to
be reduced by "statistically significant amounts each year to
levels approaching zero by December 31, 1999." 153
Although Mexico and Venezuela had initially committed to the
146. The International Dolphin Conservation Act of 1992,
H.R.Rep.No.746(I), 102nd Cong., 2nd Sess. 1992, U.S.C.C.A.N. 2919,
P.L. 102-523 (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 1411) (amended by the Interna-
tional Dolphin Conservation Program of 1997) [hereinafter IDCA].
147. Id. at § 305(a)(1).
148. Id. at § 302(b)(1).
149. Id. at § 305(a) (2).
150. Id. at § 305 (b) (1) (B).
151. Id. at § 305(b) (2) (A) (i).
152. Id. at §' 306(a) (i).
153. Id. at §306(a) (4) (B). On February 4, 1994, when it became
clear that no country was going to agree to the moratorium, the NMFS
banned all purse seine fishing in the U.S. for the remainder of the
year because the dolphin mortality rate was rapidly approaching the to-
tal kills for the previous year. This decision was quickly challenged by
the American Tuna Boat Association, but was upheld as a valid applica-
tion of the IDCA. See American Tuna Boat Ass'n v. Brown, 67 F.3d 1404
(9th Cir. 1995).
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moratorium idea,154 no country ever entered into a moratorium
agreement with the U.S. Therefore, the embargoes remained in
place. Regardless of the failure of the moratorium provision, the
IDCA did effectively ban the importation or sale, as of June 1,
1994, of any tuna that was not "dolphin safe."' 15 5 Prior to this, the
dolphin safe standard was used only for labeling, not as a re-
quirement for sale. 156
The legislative history shows that Congress was concerned with
trying to bring the MMPA into compliance with the GATT. The
fact that "the IDCA determines compliance using a ship-by-ship
rather than a country-by-country basis," was a major step towards
this goal.'57 Some argue, however, that the IDCA still failed to
meet the GATT guidelines because the import ban had not been
lifted and the U.S. still had the option to impose unilateral trade
sanctions. 58
B. Intermediary Embargo
In 1992, the Earth Island Institute (ElI) again brought suit to
force the NMFS to actively enforce the MMPA embargo provi-
sions. 59 This time, the focus was on imports of tuna from inter-
mediary nations. 60 The court agreed that the NMFS had not ac-
ted consistently with the MMPA requirements. First, the court
154. IDCA, supra note 146.
155. IDCA, supra note 146, at § 307(a)(i).
156. Hon. R. Kenton Musgrave & Garland Stephens, The GATT-
Tuna Dolphin Dispute: An Update, 33 NAT. RESOURCES J. 957 (1993).
157. Yechout, supra note 71, at 260.
158. Id. at 261; Musgrave and Stephens, supra note 156, at 971; Do-
lan-Pearson, supra note 83, at 1123.
159. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 785 R Supp. 826 (N.D. Cal.
1992), rev'd 28 F.3d 76 (9th Cir. 1994). The decision was reversed based
on jurisdictional grounds. The Ninth Circuit held that the District
Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because the court of interna-
tional trade has exclusive jurisdiction over laws providing for "embar-
goes or other quantitative restrictions on the importation of merchan-
dise for reasons other than the protection of the public's health or
safety." 28 U.S.C. § 1581(i)(3).
160. The 1988 amendments to the MMPA provided for such em-
bargoes. See discussion of 1988 amendments, supra note 85 and accom-
panying text.
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held that the statute required that all intermediary nations sub-
mit proof of their import policies, not just those suspected of
tuna laundering, as had been the policy of the NMFS. 161 Second,
the court found that it was not enough for these nations to show
that they had not imported embargoed tuna. Rather, they had to
show that they had laws or regulations in place against such
importation. 62
In order to comply with the court's ruling the NMFS greatly
expanded the list of intermediary nations subject to the secon-
dary embargo. 163 The Bush administration strongly opposed the
court's interpretation of the secondary embargo 164 and quickly
passed interim regulations, which required only that the interme-
diary nation prove that it had not imported banned tuna within
the past six months. 165 These regulations subsequently made
their way into the MMPA in the 1992 amendments to the Act. 66
As a result, the NMFS removed a number of nations from the
secondary embargo. The countries that remained subject to the
intermediary embargo included: Costa Rica, Italy, Japan, and
Spain. 67
VI. THE SECOND GATT CHALLENGE
The U.S. enforcement of the MMPA embargo against interme-
diary nations led to another challenge to the MMPA in front of a
GATT panel in July 1992.168 This time it was the European Eco-
161. At the time of the suit, NMFS only required proof from Costa
Rica, France, Italy, Japan, and Panama. See Tuna II, supra note 125, at
849.
162. Perkins, supra note 72, at 230.
163. This expansion took place in February 1992. The list of inter-
mediary nations now include: Canada, Columbia, Costa Rica, Ecuador,
France, Great Britain, Indonesia, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, Panama, the
Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, Antilles, Singapore, South Korea,
Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, and Venezuela. Tuna
I, supra note 125, at 849.
164. Bonanno and Constance, supra note 19, at 202.
165. 56 Fed. Reg. 41,701.
166. Tuna II, supra note 125, at 849.
167. Id. at 850.
168. See Tuna II, supra note 125. Although the Tuna I panel had
found the intermediary embargo in violation of the GATT, the deci-
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nomic Community (EEC) and the Netherlands that brought the
challenge. These countries asked the Panel to find that the inter-
mediary embargo on tuna was in violation of GATT. Indeed, the
Panel did reach such a conclusion, but based on slightly differ-
ent reasoning from the first Panel's findings.
The Panel's analysis with regard to Articles III and XI of the
GATT was essentially the same as in Tuna I. First, they found Ar-
ticle III inapplicable due to the product/process distinction dis-
cussed above. Second, the intermediary embargo was held to vio-
late the Article XI prohibition on quantitative import
restrictions.
The Panel then turned to exceptions found in Article XX,
where the analysis from the first Panel diverges. 69 The most sig-
nificant difference between the first and second Panel decisions
is that the second Panel held that Articles XX(b) and XX(g)
could apply to measures applied extrajurisdictionally. They based
this conclusion on the following factors. First, nothing in the text
of Article XX would suggest a territorial limitation on the mea-
sures involved. Second, two previous GATT panels had found Ar-
ticle XX(g) to apply to migratory fish without reference to where
it was caught. Third, other provisions of GATT applied extrajuris-
dictionally, such as Article XX(e) regarding the products of
prison labor. Finally, the Panel found support in the fact that as
a general principal of international law, states are not barred
sion had never become binding because it was never formally adopted
by the GATT Contracting Parties.
169. The Panel used the following three step approach to the ap-
plication of Article XX(g). First, it considered whether the policy upon
which the embargo was based fell within the range of policies intended
to conserve an exhaustible natural resource. Second, it considered
whether the embargo was related to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources, and whether it was made effective in conjunction
with restrictions on domestic production or consumption. Tuna II,
supra note 125, at 867. Third, the Panel considered the consistency of
the embargo with the preamble to Article XX which required that the
measure not be a "means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised re-
striction on international trade." Tuna II, supra note 125, Art. XX.
While this may be a good approach to the issue, the actual analysis did
not appear to differ in substance from that used in Tuna I.
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from "regulating the conduct of their nationals with respect to
persons, animals, plants and natural resources outside of their
territory."70
While this battle was won, the war was still lost, as the Panel
once again found that the intermediary ban failed the require-
ments of both XX(b) and XX(g). Again, the reasoning was quite
similar to that used in Tuna I. In their analysis, the Panel used
narrow interpretations for both XX(b) and XX(g). In the case of
XX(b), they relied on a previous panel report that interpreted
the term "necessary" to mean that one must choose "among the
measures reasonably available to it, that which entails the least
degree of inconsistency with other GATT provisions." 7 ' They
then concluded that "measures taken so as to force other coun-
tries to change their policies, and that were effective only if such
changes occurred, could not be considered 'necessary' for the
protection of animal life or health in the sense of Article
XX(b) ." 172
For Article XX(g) the court used the same linguistic interpre-
tation as that found in Tuna L The term "relating to" was read
to actually mean "primarily aimed at" the conservation of an ex-
haustible resource. 173 With this interpretation in mind, the Panel
came to essentially the same conclusion as they had for Article
XX(b), that a measure intended to bring about change in the
policies of another country cannot be "primarily aimed at" the
conservation of an exhaustible resource. 174
VII. UNILATERAL VS. MULTILATERAL ACTION
It is clear that in the end both GATT panels, through slightly
different paths, reached the same conclusion with regard to the
170. Tuna II, supra note 125, at 892.
171. Id. at 897 (quoting General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade:
Report of Panel on United States - Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930
adopted Novembei 7, 1989 Para. 5.26).
172. Id. at 898.
173. Id. at 893. Again, this was based on a previous panel's inter-
pretation. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade: Report of the
Panel in Canada - Measures effecting the exports of unprocessed her-
ring and salmon, adopted March 22, 1988 (para. 4.6).
174. See id. at 893-94.
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MMPA embargo provisions. The first Panel concluded that mea-
sures to conserve natural resources or animal health could not
be applied extrajurisdictionally under Article XX, and that even
if it could, it was too unpredictable a standard to be considered
"necessary" in the case of Article XX(b) or "primarily aimed at"
for Article XX(g). While the second panel concluded that the
measures could be applied extrajurisdictionally, it determined
that the embargo was not "necessary" for or "primarily aimed at"
the conservation goals because it required that other nations
change their policies.
Although the two Panels reached their conclusions based on
slightly different reasoning, the core concern behind both deci-
sions appeared the same: the unilateral nature of the U.S. ac-
tions. This was of concern both because of its inconsistency with
the cooperative nature of the GATT, and because of the poten-
tial for the U.S. to abuse its economic position in the interna-
tional community and market. The Tuna I panel made the fol-
lowing slippery slope argument:
[E]ach contracting party could unilaterally determine the life
or health protection policies from which other contracting par-
ties could not deviate without jeopardizing their rights under
the General Agreement. The General Agreement would then
no longer constitute a multilateral framework for trade among
all contracting parties but would provide legal security only in
respect of trade between a limited number of contracting par-
ties with identical internal regulations. 175
Although the second GATT Panel concluded that Article XX
could apply to extrajurisdictional action, the Panel expressed
very similar concerns to those voiced by the first Panel:
If Article XX were interpreted to permit contracting parties to
take trade measures so as to force other contracting parties to
change their policies within their jurisdiction, including their
conservation policies, the balance of rights and obligations
among contracting parties, in particular the right of access to
markets, would be seriously imparted. Under such an interpre-
tation the General Agreement could no longer serve as a multi-
lateral framework for trade among contracting parties.7 6
175. Tuna I, supra note 117, at 1620.
176. Tuna II, supra note 125, at 94.
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Indeed, there are many factors weighing against unilateral ac-
tion. First, there is concern that protectionist goals may be for-
warded behind the facade of environmental protection. In the
case of the tuna embargoes under the MMPA, there is, in fact,
some evidence that the U.S. was concerned about the competi-
tive advantage that was developing in the foreign tuna fleets.' 77
And of course there is no doubt that the U.S. tuna industry sup-
ported the embargoes on foreign tuna fleets.17 8 At the same time
however, there was great concern from a conservationist perspec-
tive over the level of dolphin mortality caused by the foreign
fleets, which was a motivating factor in strengthening the MMPA
with regard to foreign fleets. In addition, as of 1995, the U.S.
continued to import over 66% of its tuna, which is "hardly a mo-
nopoly for domestic harvesters."' 179 Moreover, the NMFS and
President Bush consistently resisted imposing embargoes under
the Act, until being forced to do so by a conservationist group,
the Earth Island Institute.1s0 In the end, it seems obvious that the
primary goal behind the embargoes was to protect dolphins, not
U.S. fishers.
Another common argument against unilateral action is that it
is not as effective as multilateral agreements, because other coun-
tries can simply seek alternative markets for their products.'"
177. "Legislative history reveals that in strengthening the import
prohibition provisions of the MMPA, Congress was motivated in part by
a concern that, faced with weaker regulations, the foreign fleet was en-
joying an unfair competitive advantage relative to the U.S. fleet."
Fleischer, supra note 127, at 536.
178. At the 1995 hearings discussing the IDCA, the American
Tunaboat Owners Coalition testified that: "Our tuna fishers have always
supported the MMPA embargo provisions because they were intended
to force all countries to fish under standards comparable to those ap-
plicable to the U.S. fleet." Hearings, supra note 40, at 91.
179. Hurwitz, supra note 73, at 522 citing NANCY BORKSTAID & IVAR
STRAND, FREE TRADE & GLOBAL RESOURCES: THE CASE OF PROTECTED
MARINE SPECIES 8; Inter-America Development Bank and United Na-
tions Econ. Comm. for Latin American & the Caribbean Working Pa-
per, No. 49, 1993.
180. See supra Section III.B.3. See also Dolan-Pearson, supra note
83, at 1118.
181. See Fleischer supra note 127, at 540 (citing Michael T. Parsons,
The Marine Mammal Protection Act: Working Toward an Effective Interna-
tional Solution to the Dolphin Problem, 4 TRANSNAT'L LAw 673, 675 (1981).
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This argument was made frequently by opponents of the MMPA
tuna embargoes. Undoubtedly, the effectiveness of an embargo
will depend greatly on the opportunity for alternative markets.
However, in the case of tuna embargoes, the U.S. still constitutes
a sufficient share of the market to make an embargo an effective
tool.
There is also an ethical argument that one country should not
be able to impose its conservation standards on other countries,
because different countries will have different views of proper
level of conservation." 2 The problem with this argument is that
impacts on the environment may affect people around the world,
not just in the territory in which it occurs. This is particularly
true of global resources, such as fisheries. Dolphins are not
found within the borders of any one country, but roam in what
continues to be considered the global commons - the sea. In-
deed, dolphin mortality due to tuna fishing is a classic example
of the tragedy of the commons, as each country has incentive to
use the dolphins because if they don't, another country will.
Although multilateral agreements may be the ideal solution,
there were many justifications for the use of unilateral action by
the U.S. in the case of the tuna-dolphin conflict. The principal
reason being that there was insufficient commitment in the inter-
national community to address the problem of dolphin mortality.
If the U.S. had not intervened, it is quite likely that those dol-
phins associated with tuna would be extinct today,183 especially
since the dolphins are now listed as depleted despite the U.S. ef-
forts. Second, without the threat of embargoes, it seems unlikely
that there would have been sufficient motivation to create an in-
ternational agreement on the issue.
Although the U.S. may have been justified in using a unilateral
approach in the early years, most would probably agree that the
time is now ripe for a multilateral agreement. Although the
GATT panel decisions in Tuna I and Tuna II were never en-
forced through a vote of the GATT contracting parties, they
likely encouraged the United States' efforts to create multilateral
international agreements, as discussed below.
182. See, e.g., Spracker and Lundsgaard, supra note 120, at 411.
183. "Those whose most pressing concern is the present mortality
rate among dolphins will understandably be unwilling to wait for the
conclusion of the often ponderous process of international negotia-
tion." Id. at 413.
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VIII. INITIAL STEPS TOWARD A MULTILATERAL INTERNATIONAL
SOLUTION: THE LA JOLLA AGREEMENT AND THE DECLARATION OF
PANAMA
The U.S. was an early and active participant in efforts to create
an international agreement on dolphin conservation. It was a sig-
natory to the La Jolla Agreement signed in June of 1992,184 and
then subsequently of the Declaration of Panama signed in Octo-
ber 4, 1995.185 The parties to the Declaration of Panama agreed
to commit to a binding international agreement implementing
the La Jolla Agreement on the condition that the United States
modify the Marine Mammal Protection Act. 186 Such an agree-
ment was recently negotiated at La Jolla.187 This section will out-
line the La Jolla Agreement and the Declaration of Panama. The
Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Program
will be discussed in Section IX, infra.
A. La Jolla Agreement
The La Jolla Agreement was coordinated by the Inter-
American Tropical .Tuna Commission in June of 1992 and was
signed by Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Panama, Spain, the United States, Vanuatu, and Venezuela.1 8  It
was itself based on an earlier IATTC resolution involving Mexico,
Spain, and Venezuela. 8 9 The purpose of the La Jolla Agreement
is to:
adopt a multilateral program with the objectives of (1) progres-
sively reducing dolphin mortality in the eastern Pacific Ocean
(EPO) fishery to levels approaching zero through the setting of
annual limits and (2) with a goal of eliminating dolphin mor-
184. Agreement for the Reduction of Dolphin Mortality in the
Eastern Pacific Ocean (EPO), June 1992, Colombia - Costa Rica - Ecua-
dor - France - Japan - Mexico - Nicaragua - Panama - Spain - United
States - Vanuatu - Venezuela, 33 I.L.M. 936 (1994) [hereinafter La Jolla
Agreement].
185. Declaration of Panama, supra note 52.
186. Id. at 1.
187. International Agreement, supra note 6.
188. La Jolla Agreement, supra note 184, at 940.
189. Dolphin Conservation Program adopted at a special meeting
of the IATTC, April 1992, La Jolla, California.
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tality in this fishery, seeking ecologically sound means of cap-
turing large yellowfin tunas not in association with dolphins
while maintaining the populations of yellowfin tuna in the EPO
at a level which will permit maximum sustained catches year af-
ter year .... 190
The Agreement established a yearly limit on dolphin mortality
for the EPO fishery as follows:
Year Limit Percentage of best
estimate of current
populations of spotted,
spinner, and common
dolphins
1993 19,500 0.30
1994 15,500 0.24
1995 12,000 0.19
1996 9,000 0.14
1997 7,500 0.11
1998 6,500 0.10
1999 < 5,000 < 0.08191
These annual limits were to be allocated among the fishing ves-
sels of the participating countries in the form of Dolphin Mortal-
ity Limits (DMLs). A vessel would be required to stop setting on
dolphins once its DML is reached. 192 If a vessel exceeded its
DML it would receive a proportionately reduced DML for the
following year.193 If a captain intentionally set on dolphins after
meeting limits, he or she would be subject to fines and a suspen-
sion of his or her license. 94 The Agreement also requires that
observers be present on all vessels of carrying capacity greater
than 400 short tons. Fifty percent of those observers would have
to be from the IATTC observer program. 95
190. La Jolla Agreement, supra note 184, at 938.
191. Id.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 939.
194. Intergovernmental Plenary Meeting on the Conservation of
Tuna and Dolphins in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, p. 8, June 1993; Port
Vila, Vanuatu.
195. La Jolla Agreement, supra note 184, at 939.
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The Agreement also mandated the formation of a Review
Panel composed of five or more representatives of participating
governments, two representatives of the tuna-fishing industry, two
representatives of environmental organizations, and an IATTC
representative. 196 The main functions of the Panel were to assign
individual DMLs; report on compliance with the program; and
make "recommendations" to the participating governments re-
garding training for fishing captains, appropriate fishing equip-
ment, and sanctions for violations. 197
The La Jolla Agreement also established a Scientific Advisory
Board to "assist the Director [of IATTC] in matters regarding re-
search to (a) modify current purse-seine technology to make it
less likely to cause dolphin mortality and (b) seek alternative
means of capturing large yellowfin tuna."19 8 The Director chose
the board members from the "international community of scien-
tists, fishing gear experts, the fishing industry, and
environmentalists. " 99
Finally, the Agreement proposed that dolphin sets on particu-
lar stocks be banned if the total mortality for that stock ex-
ceeded two percent of its estimated abundance. The length of
the ban would depend on the extent to which the mortality has
exceeded two percent of the abundance.2°
While the La Jolla Agreement established a fairly comprehen-
sive approach to addressing dolphin mortality in the ETP tuna
fishery, it was not a binding agreement. Nevertheless, it has pro-
vided a useful framework for subsequent negotiations and was
adopted in large part by the Agreement on the International
Dolphin Conservation Program, as discussed in Part IX.
196. Id. at 941. Only the governmental representatives are allowed
to vote.
197. The Panel met eight times between 1992 and 1995. Agree-
ment for the Conservation of Dolphins; Summary Documentation of
Decisions and Recommendations of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna
Commission, Intergovernmental Plenary, and International Review
Panel, April 1992 -January 1995.
198. La Jolla Agreement, supra note 184, at 942.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 941.
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B. The Declaration of Panama
The Declaration of Panama was signed on October 4, 1995 by
Belize, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, France, Honduras, Mex-
ico, Panama, Spain, the U.S., Vanuatu, and Venezuela.20' It af-
firmed the goals the La Jolla Agreement, and stated an intention
to formalize that agreement through a binding international
agreement, contingent upon changes in the U.S. law. These pro-
posed changes included the following: 1) lifting the primary and
secondary embargoes against any country which is in compliance
with the La Jolla Agreement and the Declarations of Panama; 2)
opening the tuna market to all IATTC members; and 3) chang-
ing the dolphin safe label to include all tuna caught without the
observed dolphin mortality.
The Panama Declaration contains a few other additions and
changes in the La Jolla Agreement to be included in the binding
international agreement. For example, the issue of bycatch is
raised for the first time,20 2 for which the Declaration states a goal
to assess and reduce such bycatch.20 3
Another significant change made between the La Jolla Agree-
ment and the Panama Declaration is the establishment of mortal-
ity limits based on dolphin stocks20 4 rather than total dolphin
populations. Specifically, the Declaration established "a per-stock
per-year cap of 0.2% of the Minimum Estimated Abundance
(Nmin)" of each stock until 2001, at which point the cap would
be reduced to 0.1% Nmin, with the total annual mortality never
to exceed 5000 individuals. Likewise, fishing would be stopped
based on the limits for particular stocks, rather than based on
the entire dolphin population, as established in the La Jolla
Agreement.
201. Declaration of Panama, supra note 52.
202. See discussion of bycatch, supra Part II.C.
203. Declaration of Panama, 'supra note 52.
204. Dolphin stocks are "geographical sub-units that can be identi-
fied by morphological or other characteristics. These sub-units with a
limited degree of mixing ... are used as the units of management on
the grounds that there is genetic diversity in the units that must be
conserved, and that their population dynamics could differ." See Hall,
supra note 10, at 5-6.
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Finally, the Declaration introduces the idea of National Scien-
tific Advisory Committees (NATSACs). These would be groups of
experts within each participating country, which would make rec-
ommendations to their governments on research needs and mea-
sures to help "conserve and manage the stocks of living marine
resources of the EPO." 205
Again, the Declaration of Panama was not a binding agree-
ment, but it successfully added to the framework established in
the La Jolla Agreement and continued the trend toward estab-
lishing a multilateral solution to the tuna-dolphin conflict.
IX. AGREEMENT ON THE INTERNATIONAL DOLPHIN CONSERVATION
PROGRAM
On June 24, 1998, the parties involved in the ETP tuna fishery
successfully completed their first binding international agree-
ment, called the Agreement on the International Dolphin Con-
servation Program. 2 6 This section will discuss the content of this
Agreement and its possible implications for dolphin
conservation.
A. The Overall Objectives of the Agreement
The overall objectives of the final Agreement are basically
identical to those established in the La Jolla Agreement and the
Declaration of Panama. These objectives are: 1) to progressively
reduce incidental dolphin mortality to levels approaching zero;
2) to "seek ecologically sound means of capturing large yellowfin
tunas not in association with dolphins"; and 3) to reduce the by-
catch of juvenile tuna and other marine species. 2° An earlier
draft also included the following objective suggested by the Latin
205. Declaration of Panama, supra note 52, at 1. "EPO" stands for
Eastern Pacific Ocean and refers to the same area as the "ETP," as
used in this article.
206. International Agreement, supra note 6. The countries partici-
pating in the negotiations included: Belize, Chile, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, France, Guatemala, Honduras, Japan, Mex-
ico, Netherlands Antilles, Nicaragua, Panama, Spain, the United States,
Vanuatu, Venezuela, and the European Community.
207. International Agreement, supra note 6, Article II.
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American Delegation: "to promote the use of the tuna stocks in
the Agreement Area, ensuring their long-term sus-
tainability .... ,,208 This fourth objective was removed from the
final draft.
Although the overall objectives of the Agreement appear to be
geared towards reducing dolphin mortality, the Agreement also
makes clear that the Parties were not willing to commit to a
'dolphin-free' tuna industry. This is indicated, for example, by
the following statement found in the Preamble:
Convinced that scientific evidence demonstrates that the tech-
nique of fishing for tuna in association with dolphins, in com-
pliance with the regulations and procedures established under
the La Jolla Agreement and reflected in the Declaration of Pan-
ama, has provided an effective method for the protection of dol-
phins and rational. use of tuna resources in the eastern Pacific
Ocean;209
Interestingly, this language is actually more moderate than that
originally proposed by the Latin American Delegation in an ear-
lier draft.2 10 Specifically, the original language read:
Convinced that scientific evidence demonstrates that the tech-
nique of fishing for tuna in association with dolphins, in com-
pliance with regulations and procedures established under the
La Jolla Agreement and the Declaration of Panama, is the most
effective method for the protection and rational use of tuna re-
sources within the ETP .... 211
Fortunately, this language was removed, for it would have estab-
lished a clear preference for setting on dolphins over other fish-
ing alternatives. Even with the modified language in the final
agreement, however, the intention to continue to use dolphins
in tuna fishing is clear.
It was also important to the Latin American Delegation to in-
clude a statement against unilateral action in this arena. As a re-
sult, the preamble includes the following statement: "Reaffirming
that multilateral cooperation constitutes the most effective means
208. Agreement on the International Dolphin Conservation Pro-
gram, draft November 7, 1997 [hereinafter, Draft International
Agreement].
209. International Agreement, supra note 6, Preamble (emphasis
added).
210. Draft International Agreement, supra note 208.
211. Id. Preamble (emphasis added).
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for achieving the objectives of conservation and sustainable use
of living marine resources." 2 2 Again, this was modified from an
earlier draft, which continued with: "and that unilateral mea-
sures implemented mainly for environmental purposes are incon-
sistent with international law and are unsuitable. 21 3 This final
statement in the earlier draft was problematic based on its poten-
tial influence on other environmental issues. However, the com-
promise language seems fair because it states a preference for
multilateral action without explicitly condemning all unilateral
actions used for environmental goals.
B. The Nuts and Bolts of the Agreement
The final Agreement adopts and expands on many of the fea-
tures introduced in the La Jolla Agreement and the Declaration
of Panama. The basic elements of the Agreement are: i) a per
year, per stock dolphin mortality limit;21 4 ii) an on-board ob-
server program for all vessels above 400 short tons, and a prohi-
bition on setting on dolphins by smaller vessels; 215 iii) operational
requirements for all vessels with a carrying capacity of 400 short
tons or more; iv) a provision for establishing Dolphin Mortality
Limits (DMLs) for individual vessels to be administered by an In-
ternational Review Panel; 2 6 v) the establishment of a Scientific
Advisory Board, 217 and National Scientific Advisory Committees, 28
vi) measures to address the bycatch problem;21 9 and vi) a self-
enforced compliance program. 220 Each of these provisions is dis-
cussed below.
1. Per Year, Per Stock Mortality Cap
The Agreement adopted the per-year, per-stock mortality limits
established in the Panama Declaration. That is a limit of between
212. International Agreement, supra note 6, at Preamble.
213. Draft International Agreement, supra note 208, at Preamble.
214. See International Agreement, supra note 6, at art. V, annex III.
215. See id. at art. XIII, annex II.
216. See id. art. V, annexes III and IV.
217. See id. at art. X, annex V.
218. See id. at art. XI, annex VI.
219. See id. at art. VI.
220. See id. at art. XVI.
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.2 and .1% of the Minimum Estimated Abundance (Nmin) until
the year 2001, at which point the limit will be .1% of the
Nmin.221 However, the total annual mortality is never to exceed
5000 dolphins. As was established in the Panama Declaration, if
the per stock limits are exceeded, then all sets on that stock
must cease for the remainder of the year. The quota is to be al-
located among the Parties to the Agreement through per-vessel
Dolphin Mortality Limits as discussed below. 222
2. On-Board Observer Program
As with much of the Agreement, the basic framework for the
observer program is based on the La Jolla Agreement. Each ves-
sel of carrying capacity greater than 400 short tons must carry an
observer during each fishing trip in the ETP. Fifty percent of the
observers are to come from the IATTC observer program, and
the remainder may come from a Party's national observer pro-
gram.22 3 The Parties must ensure that their observers collect in-
formation in the same manner as required for IATTC observers
and that they provide all raw data to the IATTC. The national
observer program may raise concern because, as mentioned
above, the incentive to "underestimate" dolphin kills is great and
a national observer may be more inclined to succumb to such
pressure.
In all other respects, however, the observer program seems
fairly well balanced. There are protections for both the fishers
and the observers. The observer is required to make all informa-
tion gathered available to the captain. The captain is given an
opportunity to provide comments in the final report of the ob-
server's trip. In addition, the observer must keep all gathered in-
formation confidential. The observers must also comply with the
laws of the Party with jurisdiction over the vessel. They must also
comply with the rules on the vessel, as long as they do not inter-
fere with their duties. On the other hand, the Agreement also
specifies that all observers must be allowed access to relevant per-
sonnel and gear, permitted on deck during dolphin sets, and
221. See id. at annex III.
222. See, infra, Section IX.B.4.
223. See id. at annex II.
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provided adequate accommodations. In addition, the Parties are
required to ensure that observers are not intimidated or bribed
by the captain or crew.
224
3. Operation Requirements for Vessels Large Enough to Set on
Dolphins
The Agreement establishes a set of requirements for vessels
fishing in the Agreement area that have a carrying capacity of
greater than 400 short tons.225 Equipment requirements include:
1) a dolphin safety panel (DSP) 226 on the purse seine net; 2) "at
least three operable speedboats;" 3) "an operable raft suitable
for the observation and rescue of dolphins;" 4) "at least two op-
erable facemasks suitable for underwater observation;" and 5)
"an operable long-range floodlight." This equipment is used to
aid in the safe release of dolphins encircled by the purse seine
net.
The Agreement also establishes behavioral requirements, such
as: requiring each vessel to release dolphins prior to hauling in
the catch, through a procedure known as "backdown," and by
physically removing individual dolphins from the net; requiring
completion of all backdown procedures within 30 minutes of
sundown; and prohibiting ,the use of explosives "during any
phase of a fishing operation involving dolphins." 221 Many of
these behavioral and equipment restrictions have been required
of the U.S. fleet for years and have proven to be effective in re-
ducing dolphin mortality.
4. Dolphin Mortality Limits (DMLs)
The concept of assigning Dolphin Mortality Limits (DMLs) to
individual vessels was first introduced in the La Jolla Agree-
ment.2218 The International Agreement adopted this concept and
224. See id.
225. See id. at annex VIII.
226. A dolphin safety panel consists of finely woven netting
around the top edge of the net where the dolphins are generally re-
leased. This reduces the risk of the dolphins getting caught in the net.
227. International Agreement, supra note 6, annex VIII.
228. La Jolla Agreement, supra note 184.
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established a general framework for the creation and implemen-
tation of DMLs.229 The process is to be coordinated by the Inter-
national Review Panel (IRP) which is composed of representa-
tives of the Parties ("government members"), three
representatives of environmental NGOs, and three representa-
tives of the tuna industry.30 However, only the governmental
members have voting authority.231
Although the DML concept seems to be an equitable way of
addressing the allocation of permitted dolphin kills, there are a
number of troubling aspects of the program, as established in
the Agreement. First, although the process is ostensibly organ-
ized on an international level, much of the information relied
upon is based on reports from individual Parties. On the one
hand it is good to provide each Party with sufficient control over
the process. For example, each Party must supply the IRP with a
list of vessels requesting a DML for the upcoming year. The IRP
will then compile a list of "qualified vessels eligible to receive a
DML. '23 2 The criteria used to make this determination rely heav-
ily on information provided by the Parties. Specifically, two of
the factors considered in determining the eligibility of a vessel
are 1) that it is "certified by the relevant national authorities to be
in possession of all of the dolphin safety gear and equipment"
required by the Agreement; and 2) that it has a captain and
crew that has received "approved training courses in dolphin re-
lease and rescue techniques comparable to a standard established
by the Meeting of the Parties. 2 33 It is difficult to know the accu-
racy with which this information will be reported to the IRP,
since the incentive to withhold negative information is likely to
be high due to the benefits of setting on dolphins and the dis-
parity in the ethical view of dolphin conservation among the par-
ties. The Agreement does not appear to provide a mechanism
for verifying this information.
Another problematic aspect of the DML program is that indi-
vidual vessels are essentially penalized for not setting on dol-
229. See International Agreement, supra note 6, at annex IV.
230. See id. at annex VII.
231. See id.
232. See id.
233. Id. at annex VI. (emphasis added)
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phins. Specifically, the Agreement provides that any vessel that
has not set on dolphins by April 1st of the year for which it has
received a DML will lose its quota for that year. Moreover, any
vessel which loses its DML "on two consecutive occasions shall
not be eligible to receive a DML for the following year."23 4 The
intent of this provision is to "deter frivolous request for
DMLs. '' 235 Whether or not this should be a goal of the program
is in itself debatable. Nevertheless, the effect will clearly be to en-
courage dolphin sets. Not only is each vessel encouraged to use its
DML, but also any DMLs that are not used by April 1st are redis-
tributed among the parties to be used by other vessels. 23 6 The
end result will be to increase the likelihood that the maximum
numbers of dolphins are killed each year, rather than to mini-
mize the numbers, as is the stated goal of the Agreement.
There are provisions, which penalize those who exceed their
DML for the year. Any vessel that exceeds its DML for the year is
barred from further dolphin sets for that year, and its DML in
subsequent years will be reduced in proportion to its excess. 237 In
addition, if the total DML for a Party's fleet has been exceeded,
all vessels in that fleet must stop setting on dolphins for the re-
mainder of the year.238 Unfortunately, these provisions are weak-
ened by the ability of the IRP to redistribute unused DMLs to
the Parties, as discussed above, and the ability of individual Par-
ties to adjust the DMLs of its vessels upward and downward dur-
ing the course of the year.23 9
5. Establishment of the Science Advisory Board and National
Scientific Advisory Committees
The purpose of the Science Advisory Board (SAB) and its
counterparts in each country, the National Scientific Advisory
Committees (NATSACs) is essentially to pursue scientific re-
search on the conservation issues in the ETP tuna fishery. This is
234. Id. at annex IV, part II.
235. Id.
236. See id. at annex IV, part III.
237. See id.
238. See id.
239. See id.
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a critical element of the Agreement - to continue to research
both the problem and potential solutions.
The goals of the SAB are to "modify current purse-seine tech-
nology to make it less likely to cause dolphin mortality and seek
alternative means of capturing large yellowfin tuna.''24° The SAB
is to be composed of up to ten members "selected from the in-
ternational community of scientists, fishing gear experts, the fish-
ing industry, and environmentalists." 241
The purpose of the NATSACs appears to be to keep well in-
formed so as to advise their respective governments on measures
to be taken to "conserve and manage stocks of living marine re-
sources in the Agreement Area. '242 The Agreement encourages
the free exchange of information between the NATSACs to bet-
ter protect the resources.
6. Measures to Reduce Bycatch
The provision addressing bycatch establishes a rather broad
and vague program for bycatch management. This is probably
due to the uncertainty that surrounds the bycatch issue, as dis-
cussed in Part II.C. The Parties are required to develop a pro-
gram to reduce bycatch in the tuna fishery, to "develop and re-
quire the use of selective, environmentally safe and cost-effective
fishing gear and techniques," and to require the live release of
sea turtles and "other threatened or endangered species to the
maximum extent practicable. ' 243 This last requirement is a vic-
tory for environmentalists who have argued that much of the
supposed bycatch problem stems from the fact that the fishers
fail to release the bycatch, preferring instead to make turtle
soup. On the whole, this provision is probably as specific as it
could be considering the current lack of scientific certainty on
the issue.
240. Id. at annex V.
241. Id.
242. Id. at annex VI.
243. Id. at art. VI.
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7. Enforcement
Perhaps the single most concerning aspect of the Agreement is
the lack of enforcement on the international level. Enforcement
of the Agreement provisions is delegated completely to each par-
ticipating government for its own fleet.244 This includes creating
an on-board observer program and an "annual certification and
inspection program" to ensure that its vessels comply with the
equipment requirements. In addition, all sanctions are deter-
mined and applied by a Party to its own vessels. Interestingly, an
Annex in an earlier draft of the Agreement, which outlined a list
of suggested sanctions, has been removed,245 and the parties are
free to impose whatever sanctions they deem appropriate. The
only oversight involved seems to be a provision requiring that
the parties inform the International Review Panel of any enforce-
ment actions taken.246 Considering the lack of incentive to pun-
ish one's own fleet, and the history of unchecked dolphin mor-
tality in the fishery, this self-enforcement mechanism appears too
weak to achieve effective compliance.
X. THE INTERNATIONAL DOLPHIN CONSERVATION PROGRAM AcT OF
11997
As indicated above, the parties involved in the ETP tuna fish-
ery conditioned participation in a binding international agree-
ment on changes in the MMPA. 247 The U.S. obliged the parties
involved by creating the International Dolphin Conservation and
Protection Act ("IDCPA"), an act that amended the MMPA. 248
The creation of the IDCPA re-opened the U.S. tuna market to
all exporting nations that: (1) are members of the IATTC or
have initiated steps to become members; and (2) are in compli-
ance with the requirements of the International Dolphin Conser-
vation Program (IDCP) .249 The IDCP is defined in the Act as
244. See id. at art. XVI.
245. See Draft International Agreement, supra note 208, at annex
XII.
246. International Agreement, supra note 6, art. XVI, para. 5.
247. See Declaration of Panama, supra Part VIII.B, at 47.
248. See IDCPA, supra note 5 (codified at 16 U.S.C.A. § 1361).
249. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1371.
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"the international program established by the agreement signed
in La Jolla, California, in June, 1992, as formalized, modified,
and enhanced in accordance with the Declaration of Panama. '" 250
As discussed, this international program was formalized into a
binding international agreement called the "Agreement on the
International Dolphin Conservation Program," in June of 1998.251
Therefore, the MMPA now requires compliance with the IDCP,
in order to gain access to the U.S. tuna markets.
The U.S. retains the right to issue regulations implementing
the IDCP, 252 however, much of the control and oversight of
dolphin protection is effectively shifted to the ETP fishing com-
munity, due to the self-enforcement mechanism established by
the International Agreement.2 53 Because proving'that a country is
non-compliant will be difficult, the United States' ability to im-
pose import restrictions on countries suspected of causing exces-
sive dolphin kills may be limited.
Moreover, the IDCPA significantly weakens the labeling re-
quirements standard of the Dolphin Protection Consumer Infor-
mation Act. In order to label tuna products "dolphin-safe", all
the law now requires is proof that no dolphins were "killed or se-
riously injured in the sets or other gear deployments in which
the tuna were caught. ' 254 It does not require any proof that the
tuna were caught without setting on dolphins.
The original legislative proposal would have implemented this
new labeling standard immediately. However, this change will not
be effective until the Secretary of Commerce makes a determina-
tion that the encirclement of dolphins adversely impacts dolphin
populations. An initial determination is required by March 31,
1999 and a final determination by December 31, 2002.255 If the
Secretary determines that the encirclement of dolphins has a
negative effect on dolphin stocks, the labeling standard will not
250. See 16 U.S.C.A. § 1362(28).
251. See International Agreement, supra Part IX, at 49.
252. 16 U.S.C. § 1413 (1994 & Supp. III 1997).
253. See International Agreement, supra Part IX, at 49.
254. 16 U.S.C. § 1385(d) (3) (C) (a) (i) (1994 & Supp. III 1997) (cer-
tification must be provided by an observer approved by the IDCP).
255. See 16 U.S.C. § 1385(g).
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change. 56
The Secretary's determination is to be based primarily on re-
search to be conducted by the National Marine Fisheries Service
(NMFS). Two main areas of research will form the basis for the
decision. First, the NMFS will conduct abundance surveys of
dolphin populations in 1998, 1999 and 2000.257 Second, the
NMFS will conduct a series of studies to determine the stress ef-
fects258 of encirclement on dolphins.
2 59
While the proposed research may provide new insight into the
effects of purse-seine tuna fishing on dolphin populations, there
will be insufficient evidence by the initial determination date in
1999 to make a conclusive decision regarding the labeling
change. Researchers at the NMFS assert that the only compo-
nents of the research that can be completed by 1999 are the
abundance surveys and the literature search. 260 Moreover, it is
unlikely that these studies will show a significant change in popu-
lation size in the near future, and will therefore be inconclu-
sive. 261 Nevertheless, the burden of proof will be on the NMFS to
256. This is not clear in the statute, but appears to be the under-
standing of everyone involved.
257. See i6 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(2) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). The last
abundance study was conducted between 1986-90 (Elizabeth Edwards,
NMFS, personal communication Jan. 26, 1997).
258. See supra Part II.A., at 7 (discussion of delayed effects).
259. 16 U.S.C. § 1414(a)(3) (1994 & Supp. III 1997). These studies
require the NMFS to conduct a review of stress-related research. See §
1414(a) (3) (A). NMFS will collect and analyze necropsy samples from
killed dolphins over the next three years (conduct autopsies). See id.
Additionally, they will review historical data on dolphins for signs of
stress caused by the fishery. See § 1414(a) (3) (B). This data will include
numerical and biological data archived at the SW Fishery Center, a
part of the NMFS. (Elizabeth Edwards, NMFS, personal communica-
tion, Jan. 26, 1997). Finally, NMFS will conduct a chase and recapture
experiment to investigate the immediate and mid-term physiological
stress responses in live dolphins. See § 1414(a) (3) (C).
260. Elizabeth Edwards, NMFS, personal communication (Jan. 26,
1997).
261. This is due to a combination of factors. First, dolphins are
long-lived and have a very low reproductive potential. Under natural
conditions, dolphins are believed to be able to increase in population
size by about 2-6% per year (this is referred to as a recruitment rate.
[Vol. X
OF DOLPHINS AND TUNA
show an adverse impact on dolphin populations, and absent such
a showing, the label change will be implemented.
XI. CONCLUSION
The long and embattled history of dolphin conservation ef-
forts in the ETP has not been without progress. Indeed, dolphin
mortality has decreased dramatically since the MMPA was first in-
troduced over 25 years ago. As of 1996, incidental mortality de-
creased to 2,500 dolphins, 262 as compared to around 550,000 in
the late 1950s.263 In many ways the IDCPA and the International
Agreement provide a good framework for continued reduction
in dolphin mortality in the ETP. They establish equipment and
behavior requirements for tuna vessels, provide a comprehensive
observer program, and establish a framework for continued re-
search on dolphin protection. Most importantly, they establish
limits on dolphin mortality below the annual recruitment rate of
the species, which. many believe will allow the populations an op-
portunity to recover and grow.
However, several aspects of the IDCPA and the International
Agreement may reduce protections for dolphins. First, the defini-
tion of the dolphin-safe label has been significantly weakened by
the IDCPA. The old definition of "dolphin-safe" only applied to
tuna caught without any use of dolphins. Now, consumers will be
buying "dolphin-safe" tuna products that may very well have re-
sulted in serious injury or long-term reproductive damage to dol-
phins. Although this change is contingent on NMFS studies of
abundance and stress effects, the burden is on the NMFS to
which is the number of dolphins added to the population less those
that died that year). See National Research Council, supra note 1, at 70.
However, until about 1993, the number of dolphins killed by tuna fish-
ing was large enough to eliminate any potential increase in the popula-
tion. Therefore, even if the kill rate in recent years has been below the
recruitment rate for the population, the potential increase is so small it
is unlikely to be detected. Moreover, due to the difficulty of making ac-
curate estimates of abundance, any population changes that were de-
tected would probably fail to be statistically significant. Elizabeth Ed-
wards, NMFS, personal communication, Jan. 26, 1997.
262. See Hall, supra note 10, at 5.
263. See Joseph, supra note 35, at 3.
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prove that encirclement adversely effects dolphin populations,
without such proof, the label change will be implemented. As in-
dicated, overcoming this burden will be difficult given the time
constraint.
Second, because the International Agreement relies primarily
on self-monitoring and reporting by each fishing nation, effective
enforcement will be difficult to ascertain. Presently, no other
country has demonstrated the same level of commitment to
dolphin protection as the U.S. In fact, many of the ETP tuna
fishing countries have actively fought conservation efforts. There-
fore, insufficient oversight by the U.S. and the international com-
munity may very well undermine the overall effectiveness of the
Agreement.
Third, despite this weak enforcement mechanism, the U.S. has
opened its market to all tuna fishing nations who are "comply-
ing" with the International Agreement. Because a country's com-
pliance with the Agreement is determined primarily by its own
reports, unless the U.S. can prove that a country is violating the
International Agreement, it will not be able to impose import re-
strictions. In other words, the U.S. may be effectively relinquish-
ing its most powerful tool in dolphin conservation efforts: the
right to impose import bans on countries causing excessive dam-
age to dolphin populations.
Thus, the question remains, why has the U.S. made such con-
cessions to the other tuna fishing countries? And were they nec-
essary? The answers seem to depend upon the following four fac-
tors. First, Congress was pressured into bringing the MMPA into
compliance with the GATT. Although the GATT panel decisions
on the tuna-dolphin issue were never formally adopted, they
stood as looming threats and that probably undermined the U.S.
position on trade issues. It can be argued, however, that the
IDCPA brought the MMPA into compliance with the GATT sim-
ply by replacing the comparability requirement with an annual
limit on dolphin mortality applied to the entire fishing commu-
nity. In addition, the International Agreement establishes a DML
program, which issues quotas on a vessel-by-vessel basis rather
than by country, which should avoid claims of unfair restrictions
against particular countries. These changes alone would have al-
lowed the MMPA to be consistent with the GATT based on the
exceptions for environmental protection found in Article XX.
[Vol. X
OF DOLPHINS AND TUNA
This is especially true since the second GATT panel held that
these restrictions could be applied extrajurisdictionally. In addi-
tion, it is unlikely that the GATT was a motivating factor in
changing the dolphin safe label, as the Tuna I panel had explic-
itly upheld the Dolphin Protection Consumer Information Act.
A second rationale for these changes was that if the U.S. did
not compromise, the foreign ETP tuna fleets would simply aban-
don dolphin conservation efforts altogether and seek alternative
markets for their tuna.264 However, although the U.S. may now
comprise a smaller share of the tuna market than before, a num-
ber of tuna companies, processors and import associations
around the world have agreed to adhere to the original "dolphin
safe" standard. 65 In fact, the Earth Island Institute claims that 90
percent of the international market is currently "dolphin-safe. '266
It is hard to know how long these agreements will last, especially
now that the U.S. has officially recognized a new definition of
"dolphin-safe." One is still left to wonder why Mexico and others
have consistently fought dolphin protections if they could have
simply shifted to other markets.
Third, it can be argued that Congress and U.S. negotiators for
the International Agreement willingly relaxed dolphin protec-
tions because of their belief that dolphins are basically out of
danger. This belief is based on assertions that dolphin mortality
levels are now low enough to allow dolphin populations to re-
cover. However, there are two major flaws in this reasoning. First,
as discussed in Part II.A., a number of factors limit the reliability
of dolphin mortality and abundance estimates. Second, there is
264. "Rather than altering behavior, more stringent restrictions
could cause foreign fleets to search for markets elsewhere. Not only
would such action raise prices for domestic consumers, but it would
also have a detrimental impact on dolphin populations because foreign
fleets would lack incentive to employ dolphin-saving techniques." See
Fleischer, supra note 127, at 540 (footnotes omitted).
265. The Earth Island Institute has arranged many of these agree-
ments and is currently working to have Starkist and the other major
tuna companies renew their 1990 pledge to buy only dolphin safe tuna
products (as originally defined). See Dolphin Death Act Dead, but Safe-
Tuna Label Still in Danger, EARTH ISLAND 25 (1997).
266. Mark Palmer, Earth Island Institute, personal communication
(Nov. 19, 1997). See also Humane Society Factsheet, supra note 50, at 13.
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no evidence of any actual increase in depleted dolphin popula-
tion levels.
Probably the most compelling reason for the U.S. concessions
was a desire to further negotiations of a binding international
agreement on this issue. It is difficult to determine, however,
whether an agreement could have been reached without some of
the more troubling changes, such as weakening the standard for
dolphin-safe labels and the abdication of enforcement to other
ETP tuna fishing nations. In the end, it seems that the U.S. may
have relaxed its stance on dolphin protection too much in an ef-
fort to appease foreign tuna nations and perhaps the interna-
tional community. The U.S. could have simply lifted the compa-
rability requirement and shifted some, but not all oversight and
management to the IATTC and the participating fishing nations;
and prohibited any alteration of the dolphin-safe label, until suf-
ficient information on dolphin abundance and stress effects is
collected. Although the recently created International Agreement
provides a solid framework for dolphin conservation in many
ways, it may very well be undermined by a lack of enforcement
and by the pressure to maximize the use of DMLs. Only time will
tell, but undoubtedly active monitoring by the U.S. and environ-
mental NGOs will prove invaluable in the effective implementa-
tion of this Agreement.
Finally, a topic carefully avoided in the tuna-dolphin debate is
the ethics of exploiting dolphins. A strong argument can be
made that chasing, trapping, and killing dolphins in order to
catch tuna is an unethical use of animals, especially in light of
the various alternative methods available. Should dolphins con-
tinue to be exploited simply because they provide the most prof-
itable form of tuna fishing? Should dolphins be killed for profit
alone? This author argues that they should not and that the U.S.
may have compromised too much too soon in this latest chapter
of the tuna-dolphin conflict.
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